1. Nor again are we in our
doctrine to begin by making up man like a clay figure, and to say that
the soul came into being for the sake of this; for surely in that case
the intellectual nature would be shown to be less precious than the
clay figure. But as man is one, the being consisting of soul and body,
we are to suppose that the beginning of his existence is one, common to
both parts, so that he should not be found to be antecedent and
posterior to himself, if the bodily element were first in point of
time, and the other were a later addition; but we are to say that in
the power of God’s foreknowledge (according to the doctrine laid
down a little earlier in our discourse), all the fulness of human
nature had pre-existence (and to this the prophetic writing bears
witness, which says that God “knoweth all things before they be Hist. Sus. 42.”), and in the creation of individuals
not to place the one element before the other, neither the soul before
the body,
nor the contrary, that man may not be at strife against himself, by
being divided by the difference in point of time.