of a result should subsist of itself without there being something to set the energy in motion;
as we say that a smith operates or works, but that the material on which his art is exercised
is operated upon, or wrought. These faculties, therefore, that of operating, and that of being
operated upon, must needs stand in a certain relation to each other, so that if one be removed,
the remaining one cannot subsist of itself. For where there is nothing operated upon there
can be nothing operating. What, then, does this prove? If the energy which is productive of
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anything does not subsist of itself, there being nothing for it to operate upon, and if the
Father, as they affirm, is nothing but an energy, the Only-begotten Son is thereby shown to
be capable of being acted upon, in other words, moulded in accordance with the motive
energy that gives Him His subsistence. For as we say that the Creator of the world, by laying
down some yielding material, capable of being acted upon, gave His creative being a field
for its exercise, in the case of things sensible skilfully investing the subject with various and
multiform qualities for production, but in the case of intellectual essences giving shape to
the subject in another way, not by qualities, but by impulses of choice, so, if any one define
the Fatherhood of God as an energy, he cannot otherwise indicate the subsistence of the
Son than by comparing it with some material acted upon and wrought to completion. For
if it could not be operated upon, it would of necessity offer resistance to the operator: whose
energy being thus hindered, no result would be produced. Either, then, they must make the
essence of the Only-begotten subject to be acted upon, that the energy may have something
to work upon, or, if they shrink from this conclusion, on account of its manifest impiety,
they are driven to the conclusion that it has no existence at all. For what is naturally incapable
of being acted upon, cannot itself admit the creative energy. He, then, who defines the Son
as the effect of an energy, defines Him as one of those things which are subject to be acted
upon, and which are produced by an energy. Or, if he deny such susceptibility, he must at
the same time deny His existence. But since impiety is involved in either alternative of the
dilemma, that of asserting His non-existence, and that of regarding Him as capable of being
acted upon, the truth is made manifest, being brought to light by the removal of these ab-
surdities. For if He verily exists, and is not subject to be acted upon, it is plain that He is not
the result of an energy, but is proved to be very God of very God the Father, without liability
to be acted upon, beaming from Him and shining forth from everlasting.
But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable at-
tribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son, as justice, goodness, eternity,
incapacity for evil, infinite perfection in all conceivable goodness? Is there one who will
venture to say that any of the virtues in the Divine nature are acquired, or to deny that all
good whatsoever springs from and is seen in it? “For whatsoever is good is from Him, and
whatsoever is lovely is from Him1164.” But he appends to this, that He is in His very essence
1164 Zech. ix. 17 (LXX.).
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.