The Nicene definition in this sense emphasized
the Unity of the Godhead in Three Persons,
against the Arian division of the Son from the Father. How then
did it escape the danger of lending countenance to Monarchianism?
Athanasius feels the difficulty without solving it, for the distinction
given by him, p. 84, between ὁμοούσιος and μονοούσιος
is without real meaning (we say with Tertullian ‘of
one substance’). On the whole in mature years he held that
the title ‘Son’ was sufficient to secure the Trinity of
Persons. ‘By the name Father we confute Arius, by the name of Son
we overthrow Sabellius’ (p. 434; cf. p. 413); and we find that
the council in its revision of the Cæsarean creed shifted υἱ& 231·ς to the principal
position where it took the place of λόγος. Beyond this the Creed
imposed no additional test in that direction (the ἐκ τῆς
οὐσίας is important but not
decisive in this respect). This was
felt as an objection to the Creed, and the objection was pointed by the
influence of Marcellus at the council. The historical position of
Marcellus is in fact, as we shall see, the principal key to the
‘conservative’ reaction which followed. The insertion into
the conservative creeds of a clause asserting the endlessness of
Christ’s Kingdom, which eventually received ecumenical authority,
was an expression of this feeling. But a final explanation between the
Nicene doctrine and Monarchianism could not come about until the idea
of Personality had been tested in the light of the appearance of the
Son in the Flesh. The solution, or rather definition, of the problem is
to be sought in the history of the Christological questions which began
with Apollinarius of Laodicea.