evil,—we must say, that in God were to be found the disorderly and the evil. Now this seems
to me an unbecoming conclusion, nay, more a dangerous one. For you wish for the existence
of matter, that you may avoid saying that God is the author of evil; and, determining to
avoid this, you say that He is the receptacle of evil.
If, then, under the supposition that matter is separate from created substances, you had
said that it is uncreated, I should have said much about it, to prove that it is impossible for
it to be uncreated; but since you say that the question of the origin of evil is the cause of this
supposition, it therefore seems to me right to proceed to inquire into this. For when it is
clearly stated how evil exists, and that it is not possible to say that God is the cause of evil,
because of matter being subject to Him, it seems to me to destroy such a supposition, to
remark, that if God created the qualities which did not exist, He equally created the sub-
stances.2839
Do you say then, that there co-exists with God matter without qualities out of which
He formed the beginning of this world?
Valentinian. So I think.
Orthodoxus. If, then, matter had no qualities, and the world were produced by God,
and qualities exist in the world, then God is the maker of qualities?
Valentinian. It is so.
Orthodoxus. Now, as I heard you say some time ago that it is impossible for anything
to come into being out of that which has no existence, answer my question: Do you think
that the qualities of the world were not produced out of any existing qualities?
Valentinian. I do.
Orthodoxus. And that they are something distinct from substances?
Valentinian. Yes.
Orthodoxus. If, then, qualities were neither made by God out of any ready at hand, nor
derive their existence from substances, because they are not substances, we must say that
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they were produced by God out of what had no existence. Wherefore I thought you spoke
extravagantly in saying that it was impossible to suppose that anything was produced by
God out of what did not exist.
But let our discussion of this matter stand thus. For truly we see among ourselves men
making things out of what does not exist, although they seem for the most part to be making
them with something. As, for instance, we may have an example in the case of architects;
for they truly do not make cities out of cities, nor in like manner temples out of temples.2840
• • • • • •
2839 The text is here in an uncertain state. Cf. Migne and Jahn.
2840 Imperfect. The rest from the Bibliotheca of Photius.
816
Concerning Free-Will.