beginning, since no idea can be formed to mark either the point at which such generation
begins or that at which it ceases. If on the other hand it is the inanimate creation to which
he is looking, even in this case, in like manner, place, and time, and matter, and preparation,
and power of the artificer, and many like things, concur to bring the product to perfection.
And since time assuredly is concurrent with all things that are produced, and since with
everything that is created, be it animate or inanimate, there are conceived also bases of
construction relative to the product, we can find in these cases evident beginnings and
endings of the process of formation. For even the procuring of material is actually the begin-
ning of the fabric, and is a sign of place, and is logically connected with time. All these things
fix for the products their beginnings and endings; and no one could say that these things
have any participation in the pretemporal generation of the Only-begotten God, so that, by
the aid of the things now under consideration, we are able to calculate, with regard to that
generation, any beginning or end.
Now that we have so far discussed these matters, let us resume consideration of our
adversaries’ argument. It says, “As all generation is not protracted to infinity, but ceases on
arriving at some end.” Now, since the sense of “generation” has been considered with respect
to either meaning,—whether he intends by this word to signify the birth of corporeal beings,
or the formation of things created (neither of which has anything in common with the un-
sullied Nature), the premise is shown to have no connection with the subject914. For it is
not a matter of absolute necessity, as he maintains, that, because all making and generation
ceases at some limit, therefore those who accept the generation of the Son should circumscribe
it by a double limit, by supposing, as regards it, a beginning and an end. For it is only as
being circumscribed in some quantitative way that things can be said either to begin or to
cease on arriving at a limit, and the measure expressed by time (having its extension con-
comitant with the quantity of that which is produced) differentiates the beginning from the
end by the interval between them. But how can any one measure or treat as extended that
which is without quantity and without extension? What measure can he find for that which
has no quantity, or what interval for that which has no extension? or how can any one define
the infinite by “end” and “beginning?” for “beginning” and “end” are names of limits of
extension, and, where there is no extension, neither is there any limit. Now the Divine Nature
is without extension, and, being without extension, it has no limit; and that which is limitless
is infinite, and is spoken of accordingly. Thus it is idle to try to circumscribe the infinite by
“beginning” and “ending”—for what is circumscribed cannot be infinite. How comes it,
then, that this Platonic Phædrus disconnectedly tacks on to his own doctrine those specula-
tions on the soul which Plato makes in that dialogue? For as Plato there spoke of “cessation
of motion,” so this writer too was eager to speak of “cessation of generation,” in order to
914 i. e.with the subject of discussion, the generation of the Only-begotten.
412
He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject…