happen that, when in respect of God we think of His being alien to injustice, the Divine
Being will be shown to be at once just and untrue, while if we regard His being alien to un-
truth, we prove Him to be at once true and unjust. So, too, of His being invisible and formless.
For according to a wise reasoning similar to that which we have adduced, it will not be
permissible to say either that the invisible exists in that which is formless, or to say that that
which is formless exists in that which is invisible; but he will comprise form in that which
is invisible, and so again, conversely, he will prove that that which is formless is visible, using
the same language in respect of these as he devised in respect to that which is imperishable
and unbeginning, to the effect that when we regard the incomposite nature of the Divine
Life, we confess that it is formless, yet not invisible; and that when we reflect that we cannot
see God with our bodily eyes, while thus admitting His invisibility, we cannot admit His
being formless. Now if these instances seem ridiculous and foolish, much more will every
sensible man condemn the absurdity of the statements, starting from which his argument
has logically brought him to such a pitch of absurdity. Yet he carps at the Master’s words,
as wrong in seeing that which is imperishable in that which is unending, and that which is
unending in that which is imperishable. Well, then, let us also have our sport, in a manner
something like this cleverness of Eunomius. Let us examine his opinion about these two
names aforesaid, and see what it is.
Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperish-
able, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one, he will be supporting our argu-
ment. But if he say that the meaning of the imperishable is one thing, and that that of being
unending is another, then of necessity, in the case of things differing from each other, the
force of the one cannot be equivalent to the force of the other. If, then, the idea of the imper-
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ishable is one, and that of being endless is another, and each of these is what the other is
not, neither will he grant that the imperishable is unending, nor that the unending is imper-
ishable, but the unending will be perishable, and the imperishable will be terminable. But I
must beg my readers not to turn a ridiculous method of condemnation against us. We have
been compelled to adopt such a sportive vein against the mockeries of our opponent, that
we might thereby break through the puerile toil of his sophistries. But if it would not be too
wearisome to my readers, it would not be out of place again to set forth what Eunomius
says in his own words. “If,” says he, “God is imperishable only by reason of the unending
in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not im-
perishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is generated.” Then re-
turning to the charge, he repeats, “He will then be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and
perishable: and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated;” for I pass over the super-
fluous and unseasonable remarks which he has interspersed here, as in no way contributing
to the proving of his point. Now I think it is easy for any one to see, by his own words, that
the drift of our argument has no connection whatever with the accusation which he lays
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.