ledge be absolute, this proves the event known to be necessary, or proves that it is impossible
but that the event should be, by some means or other, either by a decree, or some other way,
them, they infer that there is somehow a sophism in the reasoning of their opponents, or some false principle
assumed were they but happy enough to detect it. But our author, in this reasoning, does not maintain, that the
connexion by which every event is evidently certain, and therefore necessary, is so because decreed. The truth
is, that some events are foreknown to be certain because foreordained; and others, because of the tendency there
is in the nature of things themselves.—Should any, in the way of objection, assert, that the nature of things is
itself derived from the divine will, or decree; we apprehend there is no evidence to support such an assertion.
For instance, is it owing to a decree that the nature of any created being is dependent on the first cause? That a
creature, however exalted, is not infinite? That any relation should subsist between the Creator and a creature?
Or that, if equal quantities be taken from equal quantities, the remainders will be equal? Is there any room, in
thought, for a supposition of nay decree in the case? Nay more, does it appear possible for a decree to have made
such things otherwise? Let it be observed, however, that God is the almighty Sovereign over nature—not indeed
so far as to alter the nature of things, which in reality is no object of power, any more than to make spirit to be
the same thing as matter, and vice versa, or the working of contradictions is an object of power, but—by the
position of antecedents, and establishing premises. To illustrate this, let it be supposed, if God create a world,
that world must depend upon him, as a necessary consequence. To deny this, is to deny the nature and identity
of things. For what is it to create, but for an independent cause to impart, ad extra, a dependent existence? So
that to deny dependence, is to deny creation. But though the consequences be necessary, if the antecedent be
established; yet the antecedent itself is not necessary, except from the decree; for there is not, in the nature of
things, any antecedent necessity that a world be created. That is, to suppose its non-existence implies no contra-
diction, it being evidently the effect of sovereign pleasure. Hence to deny the consequence, on supposition of
the antecedent, is to deny the nature of things, and to assert a contradiction, thought the antecedent itself be
not necessary. And hence also in the instance now specified among others innumerable, the antecedent is an
object of decree, but not the consequence. It is as absurd to say, that God decreed the dependence of the world
upon himself, as it is to say, he decreed that two and two shall be equal to four, rather than to five. These remarks,
duly considered in their just consequences, will abundantly show, that some things are necessary because de-
creed,—as the creation, the preservation, and the government of the world; the redemption, the purification,
and the salvation of the church:—and that other things—as all imperfections, dependence, relations, and especially
moral evils—come to be necessary, and so capable of being foreknown, only by connexion, of consequence.
That is, if the antecedent, which is under the control of the Almighty Sovereign, be admitted, the consequence
follows infallibly from the nature of things. But if another antecedent be established, another consequence will
follow, with equal certainty, also from the nature of things. For instance: if holiness be given and continued to
a redeemed creature, as an antecedent; excellence, honour, and happiness are the necessary consequences. But
if sin operate without control, as the antecedent, dishonour and misery must be the necessary consequence from
the same cause.—W.
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SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…