previous superior strength of the Motive, but determines and chooses its own Motive, then,
when the rival Motives are exactly equal, in all respects, it may follow either; and may, in
such a case, sometimes follow one, sometimes the other. And if so, this diversity which ap-
pears between the acts of the Will, is plainly without previous ground in either of the Motives;
for all that is previously in the Motives, is supposed precisely and perfectly the same, without
any diversity whatsoever. Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the antecedent,
cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in the consequent. Perfect identity in the
ground, cannot be a reason why it is not followed with the same consequence. And therefore
the source of this diversity of consequence must be sought for elsewhere.
And lastly, it may be observed, that however much Mr. Chubb insists, that no volition
can take place without some Motive to induce it, which previously disposes the mind to it;
yet, as he also insists that the mind, without reference to any superior strength of Motives,
picks and chooses for its Motive to follow; he himself herein plainly supposes, that, with
regard to the mind’s preference of one Motive before another—it is not the motive that
disposes the Will, but—the Will disposes itself to follow the Motive.
IV. Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly inconsistent with agency; and that to
suppose a being to be an agent in that which is necessary, is a plain contradiction, p. 311.
and throughout his discourses on the subject of Liberty, he supposes, that necessity cannot
consist with agency or freedom; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make Liberty and Ne-
cessity, Action and Passion, the same thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no
action, strictly speaking, but volition; and that as to the effects of volition in body or mind,
in themselves considered, being necessary, they are said to be free, only as they are the effects
of an act that is not necessary.
And yet, according to him, volition itself is the effect of volition; yea, every act of free
volition; and therefore every act of free volition must, by what has now been observed from
him, be necessary. That every act of free volition is itself the effect of volition, is abundantly
supposed by him. In p. 341, he says, “If a man is such a creature as I have proved him to be,
that is, if he has in him a power of Liberty of doing either good or evil, and either of these
is the subject of his own free choice, so that he might, if he had pleased, have chosen and
done the contrary.”—Here he supposes all that is good or evil in man is the effect of his
choice; and so that his good or evil choice itself is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in these
words, ”he might if he had pleased, have chosen the contrary.” So in p 356, “Though it be
highly reasonable, that a man should always choose the greater good,—yet he may, if he
pleases, choose otherwise.” Which is the same thing as if he had said, he may if he chooses
choose otherwise. And then he goes on,—“that is, he may, if he pleases, choose what is good
for himself,” &c. And again in the same page, “The Will is not confined by the understanding,
to any particular sort of good, whether greater or less; but it is at liberty to choose what kind
of good it pleases.”—If there be any meaning in the last words, it must be this, that the Will
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SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives;…