only remark, in passing, on a single one of the points mentioned under this head, and will
then return to the discussion of the main question.
He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indes-
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tructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degree. Is it not, then, plain to all
what this blasphemy of a fighter against God would prove? or must we by verbal demonstra-
tion unveil the profanity? Well, who does not know the axiom, that things which are distanced
to the same amount (by something else) are level with one another? If, then, the destructible
and the generated are surpassed in the same degree by the Deity, and if our Lord is generated,
it will be for Eunomius to draw the blasphemous conclusion resulting from these data. For
it is clear that he regards generation as the same thing as destruction and death, just as in
his previous discussions he declares the ungenerate to be the same thing as the indestructible.
If, then, he looks upon destruction and generation as upon the same level, and asserts that
the Deity is equally removed from both of them, and if our Lord is generated, let no one
demand from ourselves that we should apply the logical conclusion, but let him draw it for
himself; if indeed it is true, as he says, that from the generated and from the destructible
God is equally removed. “But,” he proceeds, “it is not allowable for us to call Him indestruct-
ible and immortal by virtue of any absence of death and destruction.” Let those who are led
by the nose, and turn in any direction that each successive teacher pleases, believe this, and
let them declare that destruction and death do belong to God, to make it possible for Him
to be called immortal and indestructible! For if these terms of privation, as Eunomius says,
“do not indicate the absence of death and destruction,” then the presence in Him of the
things opposite to, and estranged from, these is most certainly proved by this treatment of
terms. Each one amongst conceivable things is either absent from something else, or it is
not absent: for instance, light, darkness; life, death; health, disease, and so on. In all these
cases, if one asserts that the one conception is absent, he will necessarily demonstrate that
the other is present. If, then, Eunomius denies that God can be called immortal by reason
of the absence of death, he will plainly prove the presence of death in Him, and so deny any
immortality in the case of the universal Deity. But perhaps some one will say that we fix
unfairly on his words; for that no one is so mad as to affirm that God is not immortal. But
then, when none of mankind possess any knowledge of that which certain people secretly
imagine, it is by their words that we have to make our guess about those secret things.
Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: “God is not called immortal by virtue
of the absence of death.” How are we to accept this statement, that death is not absent from
the Deity though He be called immortal? If he really commands us to think like this, Euno-
mius’ God will be certainly mortal, and subject to destruction; for he from whom death is
not absent is not in his essence immortal. But again; if these terms signify the absence neither
of death nor of destruction, either they are applied falsely to the God overall, or else they
comprise within themselves some different meaning. What this meaning is, our system-
581
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.