activity; would such an answer satisfy a rational man? Would it not rather be looked upon
as a very impertinent one?
3. An active being can bring no effects to pass by his activity, but what are consequent
upon his acting: he produces nothing by his activity, any other way than by the exercise of
his activity, and so nothing but the fruits of its exercise: he brings nothing to pass by a
dormant activity. But the exercise of his activity is action; and so his action, or exercise of
his activity, must be prior to the effects of his activity. If an active being produces an effect
in another being, about which his activity is conversant, the effect being the fruit of his
activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the effect of it must follow. So it
must be, with equal reason, if the active being is his own object, and his activity is conversant
about himself, to produce and determine some effect in himself; still the exercise of his
activity must go before the effect, which he brings to pass and determines by it. And therefore
his activity cannot be the Cause of the determination of the first action, or exercise of
activity itself, whence the effects of activity arise; for that would imply a contradiction; it
would be to say, the first exercise of activity is before the first exercise of activity, and is the
Cause of it.
4. That the soul, though an active substance, cannot diversify its own acts, but by first
acting; or be a determining Cause of different acts, or any different effects, sometimes of
one kind, and sometimes of another, any other way than in consequence of its own diverse
acts, is manifest by this; that if so, then the same Cause, the same causal influence, without
variation in any respect, would produce different effects at different times. For the same
substance of the soul before it acts, and the same active nature of the soul before it is exerted,
i. e. before in the order of nature, would be the Cause of different effects, viz. different Voli-
tions at different times. But the substance of the soul before it acts, and its active nature before
it is exerted, are the same without variation. For it is some act that makes the first variation
in the Cause, as to any causal exertion, force, or influence. But if it be so, that the soul has
no different causality, or diverse causal influence, in producing these diverse effects; then
it is evident, that the soul has no influence in the diversity of the effect; and that the difference
of the effect cannot be owing to any thing in the soul; or which is the same thing, the soul
does not determine the diversity of the effect; which is contrary to the supposition.—It is
true, the substance of the soul before it acts, and before their is any difference in that respect,
may be in a different state and circumstances: but those whom I oppose, will not allow the
different circumstances of the soul to be the determining Causes of the acts of the Will; as
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being contrary to their notion of self-determination.
5. Let us suppose, as these divines do, that there are no acts of the soul, strictly speaking,
but free Volitions; then it will follow, that the soul is an active being in nothing further than
it is a voluntary or elective being; and when ever it produces effects actively, it produces effects
voluntarily and electively. But to produce effects thus, is the same thing as to produce effects
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SECTION IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity…