You are quite justified, she
replied, in raising this question, and it has ere this been discussed
by many elsewhere; namely, what we are to think of the principle of
desire and the principle of anger within us. Are they consubstantial
with the soul, inherent in the soul’s very self from her first
organization παρὰ τὴν
πρώτην (i.e. ὥραν understood). This is the reading of all the Codd. for the
faulty παρὰ
τὴν αὐτὴν of the Editions., or are they something different,
accruing to us afterwards? In fact, while all equally allow that these
principles are to be detected in the soul, investigation has not yet
discovered exactly what we are to think of them so as to gain some
fixed belief with regard to them. The generality of men still fluctuate
in their opinions about this, which are as erroneous as they are
numerous. As for ourselves, if the Gentile philosophy, which deals
methodically with all these points, were really adequate for a
demonstration, it would certainly be superfluous to add προστιθέναι. Sifanus translates “illorum commentationi de
animâ adjicere sermonem,” which Krabinger wonders at. The
Greek could certainly bear this meaning: but perhaps the other reading
is better, i.e. προτιθέναι, “to propose for consideration.” a discussion on the soul to those
speculations. But while the latter proceeded, on the subject of the
soul, as far in the direction of supposed consequences as the thinker
pleased, we are not entitled to such licence, I mean that of affirming
what we please; we make the Holy Scriptures the rule and the measure of
every tenet; we necessarily fix our eyes upon that, and approve that
alone which may be made to harmonize with the intention of those
writings. We must therefore neglect the Platonic chariot and the pair
of horses of dissimilar forces yoked to it, and their driver, whereby
the philosopher allegorizes these facts about the soul; we must neglect
also all that is said by the philosopher who succeeded him and who
followed out probabilities by rules of art i.e.the syllogism.,
and diligently investigated the very question now before us, declaring
that the soul was mortal that the soul was mortal. Aristotle,
guided only by probabilities as discoverable by the syllogism, does
indeed define the soul, “the first entelechy of a physical,
potentially living, and organic body.” Entelechy is more than
mere potentiality: it is “developed force” (“dormant
activity;” see W. Archer Butler’s Lectures, ii. p.
393), capable of manifestation. The human soul, uniting in itself all
the faculties of the other orders of animate existence, is a Microcosm.
The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are
hence perishable (De Animâ, ii. 2); but the νοῦς exists before the body, into which it enters from without as
something divine and immortal (De Gen. Animal. ii. 3). But he
makes a distinction between the form-receiving, and the
form-giving νοῦς: substantial
eternal existence belongs only to the latter (De Animâ,
iii. 5). The secret of the difference between him and Plato, with whom
“all the soul is immortal” (Phædrus, p. 245 C),
lies in this; that Plato regarded the soul as always in motion, while
Aristotle denied it, in itself, any motion at all. “It is one of
the things that are impossible that motion should exist in it”
(De Animâ, i. 4). It cannot be moved at all; therefore it
cannot move itself. Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as Nemesius the
Platonizing Bishop of Emesa (whose treatise De Animâ is
wrongly attributed to Gregory), attacked this teaching of an
“entelechy.” Cf. also Justin Martyr (ad Græc.
cohort, c. 6, p. 12); “Plato declares that all the soul is
immortal; Aristotle calls her an ‘entelechy,’ and not
immortal. The one says she is ever-moving, the other that she is
never-moving, but prior to all motion.” Also Gregory Naz.,
Orat. xxvii. “Away with Aristotle’s calculating
Providence, and his art of logic, and his dead reasonings about the
soul, and purely human doctrine!” by reason of these
two principles; we must neglect all before and since their time,
whether they philosophized in prose or in verse, and we will adopt, as
the guide of our reasoning, the Scripture, which lays it down as an
axiom that there is no excellence in the soul which is not a property
as well of the Divine nature. For he who declares the soul to be
God’s likeness asserts that anything foreign to Him is outside
the limits of the soul; similarity cannot be retained in those
qualities which are diverse from the original. Since, then, nothing of
the kind we are considering is included in the conception of the Divine
nature, one would be reasonable in surmising that such things are not
consubstantial with the soul either. Now to seek to build up our
doctrine by rule of dialectic and the science which draws and destroys
conclusions, involves a species of discussion which we shall ask to be
excused from, as being a weak and questionable way of demonstrating
truth. Indeed, it is clear to every one that that subtle dialectic
possesses a force that may be turned both ways, as well for the
overthrow of truth for the overthrow of the truth. So c.
Eunom. iii. (ii. 500). as for the
detection of falsehood; and so we begin to suspect even truth itself
when it is advanced in company with such a kind of artifice, and to
think that the very ingenuity of it is trying to bias our judgment and
to upset the truth. If on the other hand any one will accept a
discussion which is in a naked unsyllogistic form, we will speak upon
these points by making our study of them so far as we can follow the
chain εἰρμόν. of Scriptural tradition. What is it, then,
that we assert? We say that the fact of the reasoning animal man being
capable of understanding and knowing is most surely most surely, ἦ. This is the common reading: but
the Codd. have mostly καὶ. attested by those outside our faith; and
that this definition would never have sketched our nature so, if it had
viewed anger and desire and all such-like emotions as consubstantial
with that nature. In any other case, one would not give a definition of
the subject in hand by putting a generic instead of a specific quality;
and so, as the principle of desire and the principle of anger are
observed equally in rational and irrational natures, one could
not rightly
mark the specific quality by means of this generic one. But how can
that which, in defining a nature, is superfluous and worthy of
exclusion be treated as a part of that nature, and, so, available for
falsifying the definition? Every definition of an essence looks to the
specific quality of the subject in hand; and whatever is outside that
speciality is set aside as having nothing to do with the required
definition. Yet, beyond question, these faculties of anger and desire
are allowed to be common to all reasoning and brute natures; anything
common is not identical with that which is peculiar; it is imperative
therefore that we should not range these faculties amongst those
whereby humanity is exclusively meant: but just as one may perceive the
principle Aristotle, Ethic. i. 13, dwells upon these principles. Of
the last he says, i.e. the common vegetative, the principle of
nutrition and growth: “One would assume such a power of the soul
in everything that grows, even in the embryo, and just this very same
power in the perfect creatures; for this is more likely than that it
should be a different one.” Sleep, in which this power almost
alone is active, levels all. of sensation, and that of nutrition
and growth in man, and yet not shake thereby the given definition of
his soul (for the quality A being in the soul does not prevent the
quality B being in it too), so, when one detects in humanity these
emotions of anger and desire, one cannot on that account fairly quarrel
with this definition, as if it fell short of a full indication of
man’s nature.