ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY
discussing the function to be ascribed on his theory to the
senses he expresses himself as follows :
" What becomes of the
senses if this doctrine be admitted ? What is their use and
office ? Just the same as before, only with this difference, that
whereas the psychological doctrine
1 teaches that the exercise
of the senses is the condition upon which we are permitted to
apprehend objective material things, the metaphysical doctrine
teaches that the exercise of the senses is the condition under
which we are permitted to apprehend or participate in 2 the
objective perception of material things."
8
Here the words
"
apprehend
" and " participation in " are plainly intended to be
synonymous. But if they are taken strictly, they really stand
for two distinct theories. When we are said to " apprehend "
the objective perception, the implication is that the objective
perception is and remains a distinct and separable existence from
ourselves in the act of knowing it. When we are said to par-
ticipate in it, the implication is that, in the act of knowing it,
the objective perception simply becomes our perception and so
part of our individual existence. The first assumption involves
difficulties, though these are not, I think, insurmountable. But
the second leads directly to the solipsism which Ferrier is so
anxious to avoid. If to be or to become known to me is to be
or to become part of my own existence it is clear that I cannot
know anything which is not included in my own existence.
I can never know anything besides myself, or even think of the
possibility of there being anything besides myself. On the
whole it is the first view rather than the second which we must
ascribe to Ferrier. But he fails to distinguish between them,
and asserts both at once, without suspecting the incon-
sistency. Take for instance the following passage :
"The
1This means for Ferrier the doctrine that things exist here independently of all relation
to cognitive minds as a precondition of their coming to be known.
2The italics are mine. 8 IVorks, vol. iii. 457.
164