CHAP. XYI. CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 237
the air, but leaves the inferior to Fortune. Against such evi
dent madness even dumb creatures lift their voice.
My intention now is, to refute an opinion which has very
generally obtained — an opinion which, while it concedes to
God some blind and equivocal movement, withholds what is
of principal moment, viz., the disposing and directing of
every thing to its proper end by incomprehensible wis
dom. By withholding government, it makes God the ruler
of the world in name only, not in reality. For what,
I ask, is meant by government, if it be not to preside so as
to regulate the destiny of that over which you preside?
I do not, however, totally repudiate what is said of an
universal providence, provided, on the other hand, it is
conceded to me that the world is governed by God, not
only because he maintains the order of nature appointed
by him, but because he takes a special charge of every
one of his works. It is true, indeed, that each species of
created objects is moved by a secret instinct of nature, as
if they obeyed the eternal command of God, and sponta
neously followed the course which God at first appointed.
And to this we may refer our Saviour's words, that he and
his Father have always been at work from the beginning,
(John v. 17 ;) also the words of Paul, that "in him we live,
and move, and have our being," (Acts xvii. 28 ;) also the words of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who, when
wishing to prove the divinity of Christ, says, that he uphold-
eth " all things by the word of his power," (Heb. i. 3.) But
some, under pretext of the general, hide and obscure the spe
cial providence, which is so surely and clearly taught in Scrip
ture, that it is strange how any one can bring himself to doubt
of it. And, indeed, those who interpose that disguise are
themselves forced to modify their doctrine, by adding that
many things are done by the special care of God. This, how
ever, they erroneously confine to particular acts. The thing
to be proved, therefore, is, that single events are so regu
lated by God, and all events so proceed from his determi
nate counsel, that nothing happens fortuitously.
5. Assuming that the beginning of motion belongs to
God, but that all things move spontaneously or casually,