This
is the famous First Edict of Diocletian, which is no longer extant, and
the terms of which therefore have to be gathered from the accounts of
Eusebius and Lactantius. The interpretation of the edict has caused a
vast deal of trouble. It is discussed very fully by Mason in his
important work, The Persecution of Diocletian, p. 105 sq. and p.
343 sq. As he remarks, Lactantius simply describes the edict in a
general way, while Eusebius gives an accurate statement of its
substance, even reproducing its language in part. The first provision
(that the churches be leveled to the ground) is simply a carrying out
of the old principle, that it was unlawful for the Christians to hold
assemblies, under a new form. The second provision, directed against
the sacred books, was entirely new, and was a very shrewd move,
revealing at the same time an appreciation on the part of the authors
of the persecution of the important part which the Scriptures occupied
in the Christian Church. The third provision, as Mason has pointed out,
is a substantial reproduction of a part of the edict of Valerian, and
was evidently consciously based upon that edict. (Upon the variations
from the earlier edict, see Mason, p. 115 sq.) It is noticeable that
not torture nor death is decreed, but only civil degradation. This
degradation, as can be seen from a comparison with the description of
Lactantius (ibid. chap. 13) and with the edict of Valerian
(given in Cyprian’s Epistle to Successus, Ep. No. 81, al.
80), consisted, in the case of those who held public office
(τιμῆς
ἐπειλημμένους), in the loss of rank and also of citizenship; that is,
they fell through two grades, as is pointed out by Mason. In the
interpretation of the fourth provision, however, Mason does not seem to
me to have been so successful. The last clause runs τοὺς δὲ ἐν
οἰκετίαις, εἰ
ἐπιμένοιεν
τῇ τοῦ
χριστιανισμοῦ
προθέσει
ἐλευθερίας
στερεῖσθαι. The difficult point is the interpretation of the
τοὺς ἐν
οἰκετίαις. The words usually mean “household slaves,” and
are commonly so translated in this passage. But, as Valesius remarks,
there is certainly no sense then in depriving them of freedom
(ἐλευθερία) which they do not possess. Valesius consequently
translates plebeii, “common people,” and Mason
argues at length for a similar interpretation (p. 344 sq.), looking
upon these persons as common people, or individuals in private life, as
contrasted with the officials mentioned in the previous clause. The
only objection, but in my opinion a fatal objection, to this attractive
interpretation is that it gives the phrase οἱ ἐν
οἰκετίαις a wider meaning than can legitimately be applied to it.
Mason remarks: “The word οἰκετία means, and is here a translation of, familia; οἱ ἐν
οἰκετίαις means ii qui in familiis sunt,—not graceful
Latin certainly, but plainly signifying ‘those who live in
private households.’ Now in private households there lived not
only slaves, thank goodness, but free men too, both as masters
and as servants; therefore in the phrase τοὺς ἐν
οἰκετίαις itself there is nothing which forbids the paraphrase
‘private persons.’” But I submit that to use so
clumsy a phrase, so unnecessary a circumlocution, to designate simply
private people in general—οἱ πολλοί—would be the height of absurdity. The interpretation
of Stroth (which is approved by Heinichen) seems to me much more
satisfactory. He remarks: “Das Edict war zunächst nur gegen
zwei Klassen von Leuten gerichtet, einmal gegen die, welche in
kaiserlichen Æmtern standen, und dann gegen die freien oder
freigelassenen Christen, welche bei den Kaisern oder ihren Hofleuten
und Statthaltern in Diensten standen, und zu ihrem Hausgesinde
gehörten.” This seems to me more satisfactory, both on
verbal and historical grounds. The words οἱ ἐν
οἰκετίαις certainly cannot, in the present case, mean “household
slaves,” but they can mean servants, attendants, or other persons
at court, or in the households of provincial officials, who did not
hold rank as officials, but at the same time were freemen born, or
freedmen, and thus in a different condition from slaves. Such persons
would naturally be reduced to slavery if degraded at all, and it is
easier to think of their reduction to slavery than of that of the
entire mass of Christians not in public office. Still further, this
proposition finds support in the edict of Valerian, in which this class
of people is especially mentioned. And finally, it is, in my opinion,
much more natural to suppose that this edict (whose purpose I shall
discuss on p. 399) was confined to persons who were in some way
connected with official life,—either as chiefs or assistants or
servants,—and therefore in a position peculiarly fitted for the
formation of plots against the government, than that it was directed
against Christians indiscriminately. The grouping together of the two
classes seems to me very natural; and the omission of any specific
reference to bishops and other church officers, who are mentioned in
the second edict, is thus fully explained, as it cannot be adequately
explained, in my opinion, on any other ground.