1. To suppose, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consists in determining, whether
to take time for consideration or not, is not agreeable to common sense, For, according to
such a supposition, the most horrid crimes, adultery, murder, sodomy, blasphemy, &c. do
not at all consist in the horrid nature of the things themselves, but only in the neglect of
thorough consideration before they were perpetrated, which brings their viciousness to a
small matter, and makes all crimes equal. If it be said, that neglect of consideration, when
such heinous evils are proposed to choice, is worse than in other cases: I answer, this is in-
consistent, as it supposes the very thing to be, which, at the same time, is supposed not to
be; it supposes all moral evil, all viciousness and heinousness, does not consist merely in
the want of consideration. It supposes some crimes in themselves, in their own nature, to be
more heinous than others, antecedent to consideration, or inconsideration, which lays the
person under a previous obligation to consider in some cases more than others.
2. If it were so, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consisted only in the act of the Will,
whereby it determines whether to consider or no, it would not alter the case in the least, as
to the present argument. For still in this act of the Will on this determination, it is induced
by some Motive, and necessarily follows the strongest Motive; and so is necessarily, even in
that act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious.
One thing more I would observe, concerning the inconsistence of Arminian notions of
moral Agency with the Influence of Motives.—I suppose none will deny, that it is possible
for such powerful Motives to be set before the mind, exhibited in so strong a light, and under
such advantageous circumstances, as to be invincible; and such as the mind cannot but yield
to. In this case, Arminians will doubtless say, liberty is destroyed. And if so, then if Motives
are exhibited with half so much power, they hinder liberty in proportion to their strength,
and go halfway towards destroying it. If a thousand degrees of Motive abolish all liberty,
then five hundred take it half away. If one degree of the influence of Motive does not at all
infringe or diminish liberty, then no more do two degrees; for nothing doubled, is still
nothing. And if two degrees do not diminish the Will’s liberty, no more do four, eight, sixteen,
or six thousand. For nothing however multiplied comes to but nothing. If there be nothing
in the nature of Motive or moral suasion, that is at all opposite to liberty, then the greatest
degree of it cannot hurt liberty. But if there be somewhat, in the nature of the thing, against
liberty, then the least degree of it hurts in some degree; and consequently diminishes virtue.
If invincible Motives to that action which is good, take away all the freedom of the act, and
so all the virtue of it; then the more forcible the Motives are, so much the worse, so much
the less virtue; and the weaker the Motives are, the better for the cause of virtue; and none
is best of all.
Now let it be considered, whether these things are agreeable to common sense. If it
should be allowed, that there are some instances wherein the soul chooses without any
Motive, what virtue can there be in such a choice? I am sure there is no prudence or wisdom
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SECTION VII. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence…