otherwise than it would be, if it were not for that particular corporeal existence. And however
the effect is insensible for the present, yet it may, in length of time, become great and im-
portant.
To illustrate this, let us suppose two bodies moving the same way, in straight lines,
perfectly parallel one to another; but to be diverted from this parallel course, and drawn
one from another, as much as might be, by the attraction of an atom, at the distance of one
of the furthest of the fixed stars from the earth; these bodies being turned out of the lines
of their parallel motion, will, by degrees, get further and further distant, one from the other;
and though the distance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may become
very great. So the revolution of a planet round the sun being retarded or accelerated, and
the orbit of its revolution made greater or less, and more or less elliptical, and so its period-
ical time longer or shorter, no more than may be by the influence of the least atom, might,
in length of time, perform a whole revolution sooner or later than otherwise it would have
done; which might make a vast alteration with regard to millions of important events. So
the influence of the least particle may, for ought we know, have such effect on something
in the constitution of some human body, as to cause another thought to arise in the mind
at a certain time, than otherwise would have been; which, in length of time, (yea, and that
not very great,) might occasion a vast alteration through the whole world of mankind. And
so innumerable other ways might be mentioned, wherein the least assignable alteration may
possibly be attended with great consequences.
Another argument, which the fore-mentioned author brings against a necessary determ-
ination of the Divine Will, by a superior fitness, is, that such doctrine derogates from the
freeness of God’s grace and goodness, in choosing the objects of his favour and bounty, and
from the obligation upon men to thankfulness for special benefits, (p. 89, &c.) In answer to
this objection, I would observe,
1. That it derogates no more from the goodness of God, to suppose the exercise of the
benevolence of his nature to be determined by wisdom, than to suppose it determined by
chance, and that his favours are bestowed altogether at random, his Will being determined
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by nothing but perfect accident, without any end or design whatsoever; which must be the
case, as has been demonstrated, if Volition be not determined by a prevailing motive. That
which is owing to perfect contingence, wherein neither previous inducement nor antecedent
choice has any hand, is not owing more to goodness or benevolence, than that which is
owing to the influence of a wise end.
2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that deter mines the Will of God, in the choice
of the objects of his favours, be any moral quality in the object, recommending that object
to his benevolence above others, his choosing that object is not so great a manifestation of
the freeness and sovereignty of his grace, as if it were otherwise. But there is no necessity
for supposing this, in order to our supposing that he has some wise end in view, in determ-
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SECTION VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's…