1. Now, if some things in
creation possess the nutritive faculty, and others again are regulated
by the perceptive faculty, while the former have no share of perception
nor the latter of the intellectual nature, and if for this reason any
one is inclined to the opinion of a plurality of souls, such a man will
be positing a variety of souls in a way not in accordance with their
distinguishing definition. For everything which we conceive among
existing things, if it be perfectly that which it is, is also properly
called by the name it bears: but of that which is not every respect
what it is called, the appellation also is vain. For instance:—if
one were to show us true bread, we say that he properly applies the
name to the subject: but if one were to show us instead that which had
been made of stone to resemble the natural bread, which had the same
shape, and equal size, and similarity of colour, so as in most points
to be the same with its prototype, but which yet lacks the power of
being food, on this account we say that the stone receives the name of
“bread,” not properly, but by a misnomer, and all things
which fall under the same description, which are not absolutely what
they are called, have their name from a misuse of terms.