world, when there was no other being; with regard to many of the dispositions and acts of
the divine Being, such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness, hating sin, &c. So they
apply them to many cases of the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings wherein
all opposition of the Will is excluded in the very supposition of the case.
Metaphysical or philosophical Necessity is nothing different from their certainty. I speak
not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themselves, which
is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge, or that wherein lies the ground of the
infallibility of the proposition which affirms them.
What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophical Necessity, namely, ”That by
which a thing cannot but be,“ or ”whereby it cannot be otherwise,” fails of being a proper
explanation of it, on two accounts: First, the words can, or cannot, need explanation as much
as the word Necessity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by
the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we say, a thing cannot but be,
we might explain ourselves by saying, it must necessarily be so; as well as explain Necessity,
by saying, it is that by which a thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this definition is liable to
the fore-mentioned great inconvenience; the words cannot, or unable, are properly relative,
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and have relation to power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing spoken of;
to which as I have now observed, the word Necessity, as used by philosophers, has no refer-
ence.
Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connexion between
the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something
to be true. When there is such a connexion, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is
necessary, in a philosophical sense; whether any opposition or contrary effort be supposed,
or no. When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of
any thing, either substance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and certain connexion,
then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense. And
in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following discourse, when I endeavor to prove
that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty.
The subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms existence of something, may
have a full, fixed, and certain connexion several ways.
(1.) They may have a full and perfect connexion in and of themselves; because it may
imply a contradiction, or gross absurdity, to suppose them not connected. Thus many things
are necessary in their own nature. So the eternal existence of being generally considered, is
necessary in itself: because it would be in itself the greatest absurdity, to deny the existence
of being in general, or to say there was absolute and universal nothing; and is as it were the
sum of all contradictions; as might be shown if this were a proper place for it. So God’s in-
finity and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary in its own nature, that two and
two should be four; and it is necessary that all right lines drawn from the center of a circle
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SECTION III. Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility,…