but the Cause, must immediately run himself out of his own assertion; and in maintaining
it, will insensibly contradict and deny it.
This is certain, that if effects are vicious and faulty, not from their Nature, or from any
thing inherent in them, but because they are from a bad Cause, it must be on account of the
badness of the Cause: a bad effect in the Will must be bad, because the Cause is bad, or of
an evil Nature, or has badness as a quality inherent in it: and a good effect in the Will must
be good, by reason of the goodness of the Cause, or its being of a good Kind and Nature. And
if this be what is meant, the very supposition of fault and praise lying not in the Nature of
the thing, but the Cause, contradicts itself, and does at least resolve the Essence of virtue
and vice into the Nature of things, and supposes it originally to consist in that.—And if a
caviler has a mind to run from the absurdity, by saying, “No, the fault of the thing, which
is the Cause, lies not in this, that the Cause itself is of an evil Nature, but that the Cause is
evil in that sense, that it is from another bad Cause.” Still the absurdity will follow him; for,
if so, then the Cause before charged is at once acquitted, and all the blame must be laid to
the higher Cause, and must consist in that’s being evil, or of an evil Nature. So now, we are
come again to lay the blame of the thing blameworthy, to the Nature of the thing, and not
to the Cause. And if any is so foolish as to go higher still, and ascend from step to step, till
he is come to that which is the first Cause concerned in the whole affair, and will say, all the
blame lies in that; then, at last, he must be forced to own, that the faultiness of the thing,
which he supposes alone blameworthy, lies wholly in the Nature of the thing, and not in the
Original or Cause of it; for the supposition is, that it has no Original, it is determined by no
act of ours, is caused by nothing faulty in us, being absolutely without any Cause. And so
the race is at an end, but the evader is taken in his flight.
It is agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that moral evil, with its desert of dislike
and abhorrence, and all its other ill deservings, consists in a certain deformity in the Nature
of certain dispositions of the heart and acts of the Will; and not in the deformity of something
else, diverse from the very thing itself; which deserves abhorrence, supposed to be the Cause
of it. Which would be absurd, because that would be to suppose a thing that is innocent and
not evil, is truly evil and faulty, because another thing is evil. It implies a contradiction; for
it would be to suppose, the very thing, which is morally evil and blameworthy, is innocent
and not blameworthy; but that something else, which is its Cause, is only to blame. To say,
that vice does not consist in the thing which is vicious, but in its Cause, is the same as to
say, that vice does not consist in vice, but in that which produces it.
It is true, a Cause may be to blame, for being the Cause of vice: it may be wickedness in
the Cause that it produces wickedness. But it would imply a contradiction, to suppose that
these two are the same individual wickedness. The wicked act of the Cause in producing
wickedness, is one wickedness; and the wickedness produced, if there be any produced, is
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SECTION I. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart,…