Chapter 4.—That from the Disputation of Varro, It Follows that the Worshippers of
the Gods Regard Human Things as More Ancient Than Divine Things.
In this whole series of most beautiful and most subtle distributions and distinctions, it
will most easily appear evident from the things we have said already, and from what is to
be said hereafter, to any man who is not, in the obstinacy of his heart, an enemy to himself,
that it is vain to seek and to hope for, and even most impudent to wish for eternal life. For
these institutions are either the work of men or of demons,—not of those whom they call
good demons, but, to speak more plainly, of unclean, and, without controversy, malign
spirits, who with wonderful slyness and secretness suggest to the thoughts of the impious,
and sometimes openly present to their understandings, noxious opinions, by which the
human mind grows more and more foolish, and becomes unable to adapt itself to and abide
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in the immutable and eternal truth, and seek to confirm these opinions by every kind of
fallacious attestation in their power. This very same Varro testifies that he wrote first con-
cerning human things, but afterwards concerning divine things, because the states existed
first, and afterward these things were instituted by them. But the true religion was not insti-
tuted by any earthly state, but plainly it established the celestial city. It, however, is inspired
and taught by the true God, the giver of eternal life to His true worshippers.
The following is the reason Varro gives when he confesses that he had written first
concerning human things, and afterwards of divine things, because these divine things were
instituted by men:—“As the painter is before the painted tablet, the mason before the edifice,
so states are before those things which are instituted by states.” But he says that he would
have written first concerning the gods, afterwards concerning men, if he had been writing
concerning the whole nature of the gods,—as if he were really writing concerning some
portion of, and not all, the nature of the gods; or as if, indeed, some portion of, though not
all, the nature of the gods ought not to be put before that of men. How, then, comes it that
in those three last books, when he is diligently explaining the certain, uncertain and select
gods, he seems to pass over no portion of the nature of the gods? Why, then, does he say,
“If we had been writing on the whole nature of the gods, we would first have finished the
divine things before we touched the human?” For he either writes concerning the whole
nature of the gods, or concerning some portion of it, or concerning no part of it at all. If
concerning it all, it is certainly to be put before human things; if concerning some part of
it, why should it not, from the very nature of the case, precede human things? Is not even
some part of the gods to be preferred to the whole of humanity? But if it is too much to
prefer a part of the divine to all human things, that part is certainly worthy to be preferred
to the Romans at least. For he writes the books concerning human things, not with reference
to the whole world, but only to Rome; which books he says he had properly placed, in the
order of writing, before the books on divine things, like a painter before the painted tablet,
or a mason before the building, most openly confessing that, as a picture or a structure, even
That from the Disputation of Varro, It Follows that the Worshippers of the Gods Regard Human Things as More Ancient Than Divine Things.
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That from the Disputation of Varro, It Follows that the Worshippers of the…