CHAP. II.
J
CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 237
frequently occurs in all writers, few have defined. Yet Origeu
apj)ears to have advanced a position to which they all assented,
when he calls it a power of reason to discern good and evil, of
will to choose either . Nor does Augustine differ from him/
when he teaches that it is a power of reason and will, by
^
which good is chosen wherr"grace assists; and evil, when*
grace is wanting. Bernard, while he affects greater subtlety,
"KaS expressed himself with more obscurity: he says, it is a
consent on account of the liberty of will, which cannot be lost,
and the judgment of reason, which cannot be avoided. The
definition of Anselm is not sufficiently plain, who states it to
be a power of preserving rectitude for its own sake. There-
fore Peter Lombard and the schoolmen have rather adopted the
definition of Augustine, because it was more explicit, and did
not exclude the grace of God, without which they perceived
that the will had no power of itself. But they also make such
additions of their own, as they conceived to be either better
or conducive to further explication. First, they agree that the
word arhitrium, will or choice, should rather be referred to rea-
son, whose office it is to discern between good and evil ; and
that the epithet /;-ee belongs properly to the faculty of the will
which is capable of being inclined to either. Wherefore, since
liberty belongs properly to the will, Thomas Aquinas says, thai
it would be a very good definition, if free will were called an
electivepower, which, being composed of understanding and ap-
|
petite, inclines rather to appetite. We see where they represent !
the power of free will to be placed ; that is, in the reason and
will. It now remains briefly to inquire how much they attri-
bute respectively to each.
V. Common and external things, which do not pertain to
the kingdom of God, they generally consider as subject to the ^
free determination ofman ; but true righteousness they refer to
the special grace of God and spiritual regeneration. With a
view to support this notion, the author of the treatise "On the
Vocation of the Gentiles " enumerates three kinds of will— the
first a sensitive, the second an animal, and the third a spiritual
one : the two former of which he states to be freely exercisecJ
by us, and the last to be the work of the Holy Spirit in us.
The truth or falsehood of this shall be discussed in the proper
nlace ; for my design at present is briefly to recite the opinions
of others, not to refute them. Hence, when writers treat of
free will, their first mquiry respects not its ability in civil
or external mixtions, but its power to obey the Divine law. ^
Though I confess the latter to be the principal question, yet I
think the other ought not to be wholly neglected ; and for this
opiniim I hope to give a very good reason. But a distinction
has pioviiled in the schools, which enumerates three kinds of