there is the Supreme and Absolute Being, and another Being
existing through the First, but after It. The language of this exposition of Eunomius is Aristotelian: but
the contents nevertheless are nothing more nor less than Gnosticism, as
Rupp well points out (Gregors v. Nyssa Leben und Meinungen, p. 132
sq.). Arianism, he says, is nothing but the last attempt of Gnosticism
to force the doctrine of emanations into Christian theology, clothing
that doctrine on this occasion in a Greek dress. It was still an
oriental heresy, not a Greek heresy like Pelagianism in the next
century.
Rupp gives two reasons why
Arianism may be identified with Gnosticism.
1. Arianism holds the
Λόγος as the highest being after the Godhead, i.e. as the
πρωτότοκος
τῆς
κτίσεως,
and as merely the mediator between God and Man: just as it was the
peculiar aim of Gnosticism to bridge over the gulf between the Creator
and the Created by means of intermediate beings (the
emanations).
2. Eunomius and his master
adopted that very system of Greek philosophy which had always been the
natural ally of Gnosticism: i.e. Aristotle is strong in divisions and
differences, weak in ‘identifications:’ he had marked with
a clearness never attained before the various stages upwards of
existencies in the physical world: and this is just what Gnosticism, in
its wish to exhibit all things according to their relative distances
from the ᾽Αγέννητος, wanted.
Eunomius has in fact in
this formula of his translated all the terms of Scripture straight into
those of Aristotle: he has changed the ethical-physical of Christianity
into the purely physical; πνεύμα e.g.
becomes οὐσία: and by
thus banishing the spiritual and the moral he has made his ᾽Αγέννητος
as completely ‘single’ and incommunicable
as the τὸ
πρῶτον
κίνουν
ἀκίνητον (Arist. Metaph. XII. 7).