This example being understood,
it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we
comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence from no antecedent
one. Accordingly, we call God ungenerate as existing ungenerately,
reducing this notion of ungeneracy into verbal form. That He is without
origin or beginning we show by the force of the term. But what that
Being is which exists ungenerately, this appellation does not lead us
to discern. Nor was it to be supposed that the processes of conception
could avail to raise us above the limits of our nature, and open up the
incomprehensible to our view, and enable us to compass the knowledge of
that which no knowledge can approach Cf.
Origen c. Celsum, vi. 65. Celsus had said, “God cannot be
named.” “This requires a distinction to be made. If Celsus
means that there is nothing in the signification of words that can
express the qualities of God, what he says is true, seeing that there
are many other qualities that cannot be named. Who, for instance, can
express in words the difference of quality between the sweetness of a
date and that of a fig? Peculiar individual qualities cannot be
expressed in a word. No wonder, then, that in this absolute sense God
cannot be named. But if by ‘name’ we only mean the possible
expression of some one thing about God, by way of leading on the
listener, and producing in him such a notion about God as human
faculties can reach to, then there is nothing strange in saying, that
God can have a name.”. Nevertheless,
our adversary storms at our Master, and tries to tear to pieces his
teaching respecting the faculty of thought and conception, and derides
what has been said, revelling as usual in the rattle of his jingling
phraseology, and saying that he (Basil) shrinks from adducing evidence
respecting those things of which he presumes to be the interpreter.
For, quoting certain of the Master’s speculations on the faculty
of conception, in which he shows that its exercise finds place, not
only in reference to vain and trivial objects, but that it is competent
to deal also with weightier matters, he, by means of his speculation
about the corn, and seed, and other food (in Genesis), brings Basil
into court with the charge, that his language is a following of pagan
philosophy τῃ ἔξωθεν
φιλοσοφί&
139·. Eunomius, in this accusation, must
have been thinking, in the θέσει and
φύσει controversy on the origin of language, of Democritus, who
called words “statues in sound,” i.e. ascribed to
them a certain amount of artificiality. But it is doubtful whether the
opinion of the purely human origin of language can be ascribed to him,
when we consider another expression of his, that “words were
statues in sound, but statues not made by the hands of men, but by the
gods themselves.” Language with him was conventional, but it was
not arbitrary. Again, Plato defines a word, an imitation in sound of
that which it imitates (Cratylus, 423 B), and Aristotle calls words
imitations (Rhet. iii. 1). But both of them were very far indeed from
tracing language back to mere onamatopœia, i.e. ascribing
it to θέσις (agreement), as opposed to φύσις in the
sense of the earlier Greek philosophy, the “essence” of the
thing named, rather than the “nature” of the names. Long
before them Pythagoras had said, “the wisest of all things is
Number, and next to Number, that which gives names.” These
oracular words do not countenance the idea that the origin of language
was purely human. Perhaps Epicurus more definitely than any taught that
in the first formation of language men acted unconsciously, moved by
nature (in the modern sense), and that then as a second stage there was
an agreement or understanding to use a certain sound for a certain
conception. Against this Heraclitus (b.c. 503)
had taught that words exist φύσει.
“Words are like the shadows of things, like the pictures of trees
and mountains reflected in the river, like our own images when we look
into a mirror.” We know at all events here what he did not
mean, viz., that man imposed what names he pleased on the objects round
him. Heraclitus’ “nature” is a very different thing
from the Darwinian Nature; it is the inherent fitness between the
object and name. Eunomius, then, was hardly justified in calling the
Greek philosophy, as a whole, atheistical in this matter, and
“against Providence.” This φύσις, the
impalpable force in the things named, could still be represented as the
will of the Deity. Eunomius outdoes Origen even, or any Christian
writer, in contending for the sacredness of names. He makes the Deity
the name-giver, but with the sole object of deifying his
“Ungenerate.” Perhaps Basil’s teaching of the human
faculty of ᾽Επίνοια
working under God as the name-giver is the truest
statement of all, and harmonizes most with modern thought., and that he is circumscribing
Divine Providence, as not allowing that words were given to things by
God, and that he is fighting in the ranks of the Atheists, and taking
arms against Providence, and that he admires the doctrines of the
profane rather than the laws of God, and ascribes to them the palm of
wisdom, not having observed in the earliest of the sacred records, that
before the creation of man, the naming of fruit and seed are mentioned
in Holy Writ.