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of the act and choice, so that in the nature of the things, volition cannot take place without some previous reason and Motive to induce it;” and that this act is consequent upon, and follows the Motive? Which things Mr. Chubb often asserts, as of certain and undoubted truth. So that the very same Motive is both previous and consequent, both before and after, both the ground and fruit of the very same thing! II. Agreeable to the forementioned inconsistent notion of the Will first acting towards the Motive, choosing whether it will comply with it, in order to it becoming a ground of the Will’s acting, before any act of volition can take place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and excitements to the action of the Will, ” the passive ground or reason of that action.” Which is a remarkable phrase; than which I presume there is none more unintelligible, and void of distinct and consistent meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas Aquinas. When he represents the Motive volition as passive, he must mean—passive in that affair, or passive with respect to that action, which he speaks of; otherwise it is nothing to the design of his argument: he must mean, (if that can be called a meaning,) that the Motive to volition is first acted upon or towards by the volition, choosing to yield to it, making it a ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence from thence; and so to make it a previous ground of its own excitation and existence. Which is the same absurdity, as if one should say, that the soul of man, previous to its existence, chose by what cause it would come into existence, and acted upon its cause, to fetch influence thence, to bring it into being; and so its cause was a passive ground of its existence! Mr. Chubb very plainly supposes Motive or excitement to be the ground of the being of volition. He speaks of it as the ground or reason of the exertion of an act of the Will, (p. 391, and 392.) and expressly says, that “volition cannot take place without some previous ground or Motive to induce it,” (p. 363.) And he speaks of the act as “from the Motive, and from the influence of the Motive,” (p. 352.) “and from the influence that the Motive has on the man, for the production of an action,” (p. 317.) Certainly there is no need of multiplying words about this; it is easily judged, whether Motive can be the ground of volition taking place, so that the very production of it is from the influence of the Motive, and yet the Motive, before it becomes the ground of the volition, is passive, or acted upon the volition. But this I will say, that a man, who insists so much on clearness of meaning in others, and is so much in blaming their confusion and inconsistence, ought, if he was able, to have explained his meaning in this phrase of “passive ground of action,” so as to show it not to be confused and inconsistent. If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb, when he speaks of Motive as a “passive ground 28 of action,” does not mean passive with regard to that volition which it is the ground of, but some other antecedent volition, (though his purpose and argument, and whole discourse, will by no means allow of such a supposition,) yet it would not help the matter in the least. For, (1.) If we suppose an act, by which the soul chooses to yield to the invitation of a Motive 585 SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives;…

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