is diminished, and he suffers what is disagreeable to him, or is the subject of something that
is of a nature contrary to joy and happiness, even pain and grief. 153
From this last axiom it follows, that if no distinction is to be admitted between God’s
hatred of sin, and his Will with respect to the event and the existence of sin, as the all-wise
Determiner of all events, under the view of all consequences through the whole compass
and series of things; I say, then it certainly follows, that the coming to pass of every individual
act of sin is truly, all things considered, contrary to his Will, and that his Will is really crossed
in it; and this in proportion as he hates it. And as God’s hatred of sin is infinite, by reason
of the infinite contrariety of his Holy Nature to sin; so his Will is infinitely crossed, in every
act of sin that happens. Which is as much as to say, he endures that which is infinitely dis-
agreeable to him, by means of every act of sin that he sees committed. And, therefore, as
appears by the preceding positions, he endures truly and really, infinite grief or pain from
every sin. And so he must be infinitely crossed, and suffer infinite pain, every day, in millions
of millions of instances: he must continually be the subject of an immense number of real,
and truly infinitely great crosses and vexations. Which would be to make him infinitely the
most miserable of all Beings.
If any objector should say; all that these things amount to, is, that God may do evil that
good may come; which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in men; and therefore may be
justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. I answer, that for God to
dispose and permit evil, in the manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good
may come; for it is not to do evil at all.—In order to a thing being morally evil, there must
be one of these things belonging to it, either it must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its
own nature; or it must have a bud tendency; or it must proceed from an evil disposition,
and be done for an evil end. But neither of these things can be attributed to God’s ordering
and permitting such events, as the immoral acts of creatures, for good ends. (1.) It is not
unfit in its own nature, that he should do so. For it is in its own nature fit, that infinite wis-
dom, and not blind chance, should dispose moral good and evil in the world. And it is fit,
that the Being who has infinite wisdom, and is the Maker, Owner, and Supreme Governor
of the world, should take care of that matter. And, therefore, there is no unfitness or unsuit-
ableness in his doing it. It may be unfit, and so immoral, for any other beings to go about
to order this affair; because they are not possessed of a wisdom that in any manner fits them
for it; and, in other respects, they are not fit to be trusted with this affair; nor does it belong
to them, they not being the owners and lords of the universe.
153 Certainly it is not less absurd and unreasonable, to talk of God’s Will and Desires being truly and properly
crossed, without his suffering any uneasiness, or any thing grievous or disagreeable, than it is to talk of something
that may be called a revealed Will, which may, in some respect, be different from a secret purpose, which purpose
may be fulfilled, when the other is opposed.
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SECTION IX. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been…