Chapter XX.
It is, then, universally acknowledged that we must believe the Deity to be not only
almighty, but just, and good, and wise, and everything else that suggests excellence. It follows,
therefore, in the present dispensation of things, that it is not the case that some particular
one1992 of these Divine attributes freely displays itself in creation, while there is another
that is not present there; for, speaking once for all, no one of those exalted terms, when
disjoined from the rest, is by itself alone a virtue, nor is the good really good unless allied
with what is just, and wise, and mighty (for what is unjust, or unwise, or powerless, is not
good, neither is power, when disjoined from the principle of justice and of wisdom, to be
considered in the light of virtue; such species of power is brutal and tyrannous; and so, as
to the rest, if what is wise be carried beyond the limits of what is just, or if what is just be
not contemplated along with might and goodness, cases of that sort one would more properly
call vice; for how can what comes short of perfection be reckoned among things that are
good?). If, then, it is fitting that all excellences should be combined in the views we have of
God, let us see whether this Dispensation as regards man fails in any of those conceptions
which we should entertain of Him. The object of our inquiry in the case of God is before all
things the indications of His goodness. And what testimony to His goodness could there
be more palpable than this, viz. His regaining to Himself the allegiance of one who had re-
volted to the opposite side, instead of allowing the fixed goodness of His nature to be affected
by the variableness of the human will? For, as David says, He had not come to save us had
not “goodness” created in Him such a purpose1993; and yet His goodness had not advanced
His purpose had not wisdom given efficacy to His love for man. For, as in the case of persons
who are in a sickly condition, there are probably many who wish that a man were not in
such evil plight, but it is only they in whom there is some technical ability operating in behalf
of the sick, who bring their good-will on their behalf to a practical issue, so it is absolutely
needful that wisdom should be conjoined with goodness. In what way, then, is wisdom
contemplated in combination with goodness; in the actual events, that is, which have taken
place? because one cannot observe a good purpose in the abstract; a purpose cannot possibly
be revealed unless it has the light of some events upon it. Well, the things accomplished,
progressing as they did in orderly series and sequence, reveal the wisdom and the skill of
1992 τὸ μέν τι (for τοι). There is the same variety of reading in c. i. and xxi., where Krabinger has preserved
the τι: he well quotes Synesius, de Prov. ii. 2; ῾Ο μέν τις ἀποθνήσκει πληγεὶς, ὁ δὲ κ.τ.λ. (and refers to his note
there).
1993 Ps. cvi. (cv.) 4, 5; cxix. (cxviii.) 65, 66, 68. In the first passage the LXX. has τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἐν τῇ χρηστότητι
τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν σου (Heb. “the felicity of Thy chosen”): evidently referring to God’s εὐδοκία in them; He, good
Himself (χρηστὸς, v. 1), will save them, “in order to approve their goodness.” The second passage mentions four
times this χρηστότης (bonitas).
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Chapter XX