But what need is there in our
discourse to reveal his hidden deceit by mere guesses at his intention,
and possibly to give our hearers occasions for objection, on the ground
that we make these charges against our enemies untruly? For lo, he sets
forth to us his blasphemy in its nakedness, not hiding his guile by any
veil, but speaking boldly in his absurdities with unrestrained voice.
What he has written runs thus:—“We, for our part,” he
says, “as we find nothing else besides the essence of the Son
which admits of the generation, are of opinion that we must assign the
appellations to the essence itself, or else we speak of
‘Son’ and ‘begotten’ to no purpose, and as a
mere verbal matter, if we are really to separate them from the essence;
starting from these names, we also confidently maintain that the
essences are variant from each other The
whole passage is rather obscure, and Oehler’s punctuation renders
it perhaps more obscure than that which is here adopted. The argument
seems to be something like this:—“The generated essence is
not compared with any of the things made by it, or after it, because
being only-begotten it leaves no room for a common basis of
comparison with anything else, and the operation of its maker is also
peculiar to itself (since it is immediate, the operation in the case of
other things being mediate). The essence of the Son, then, being
so far isolated, it is to it that the appellations of γέννημα, ποίημα,
and κτίσμα are
to be assigned; otherwise the terms ‘Son’ and
‘Only-begotten’ are meaningless. Therefore the Son, being
in essence a ποίημα or κτίσμα, is
alien from the Father Who made or created Him.” The word
παρηλλάχθαι, used to express the difference of essence between the
Father and the Son, is one for which it is hard to find an equivalent
which shall suit all the cases of the use of the word afterwards
instanced: the idea of “variation,” however, seems to
attach to all these cases, and the verb has been translated
accordingly..”