be so powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith.
When motives or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty in
going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And
therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the
difficulty so great, that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it; for this plain reason,
because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that
power is not infinite; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten de-
grees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength
are beyond the degrees of difficulty; yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred,
or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insuf-
ficient to surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such
a thing as a sure and perfect connexion between moral causes and effects; so this only is what
I call by the name of moral Necessity.
2. When I use this distinction of moral and natural Necessity, I would not he understood
to suppose, that if any thing come to pass by the former kind of Necessity, the nature of
things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine, that when
a moral habit or motive is so strong, that the act of the Will infallibly follows, this is not
owing to the nature of things. But natural and moral are the terms by which thee two kinds
of Necessity have usually been called; and they must be distinguished by some names, for
there is a difference between them, that is very important in its consequences. This difference,
however, does not lie so much in the nature of the connexion, as in the two terms connected.
The cause with which the effect is connected, is of a particular kind; viz. that which is of a
moral nature; either some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the
understanding. And the effect is also of a particular kind; being likewise of a moral nature;
consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul, or voluntary action.
I suppose, that Necessity which is called natural in distinction from moral Necessity, is
so called, because mere nature, as the word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any thing
of choice. The word natureis often used in opposition to choice; not because nature has indeed
never any hand in our choice; but, probably, because we first get our notion of nature from
that obvious course of events, which we observe in many things where our choice has no
concern; and especially in the material world; which, in very many parts of it, we easily
perceive to be in a settled course; the stated order, and manner of succession, being very
apparent. But where we do not readily discern the rule and connexion, (though there be a
connexion, according to an established law, truly taking place,) we signify the manner of
event by some other name. Even in many things which are seen in the material and inanimate
world, which do not obviously come to pass according to any settled course, men do not
call the manner of the event by the name of nature, but by such names as accident, chance,
contingence, &c. So men make a distinction between nature and choice; as if they were
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SECTION IV Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.…