But since the nature of most
things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all
that they connote being comprehended in one word, as, for instance, in
the case of fire, the element itself is one thing in its nature, while
the word which denotes it is another (for fire itself possesses the
qualities of shining, of burning, of drying and heating, and consuming
whatever fuel it lays hold of, but the name is but a brief word of one
syllable), on this account speech, which distinguishes the powers and
qualities seen in fire, gives each of them a name of its own, as I have
said before. And one cannot say that only a name has been given to fire
when it is spoken of as bright, or consuming, or anything else that we
observe it to be. For such words denote qualities physically inherent
in it. So likewise, in the case of heaven and the firmament, though one
nature is signified by each of these words, their difference represents
one or other of its peculiar characteristics, in looking at which we
learn one thing by the appellation “heaven,” and another by
“firmament.” For when speech would define the limit of
sensible creation, beyond which it is succeeded by the transmundane
void apprehended by the mind alone, in contrast with the intangible and
incorporeal and invisible, the beginning and the end of all material
subsistences is called the firmament. And when we survey the
environment of terrestrial things, we call that which encompasses all
material nature, and which forms the boundary of all things visible, by
the name of heaven. In the same manner with regard to earth and dry
land, since all heavy and downward-tending nature was divided into
these two elements, earth and water, the appellation “dry”
defines to a certain extent its opposite, for earth is called dry in
opposition to moist, since having thrown off, by Divine command, the
water that overspread it, it appeared in its own character. But the
name “earth” does not continue to express the signification
of some one only of its qualities, but, by virtue of its meaning, it
embraces all that the word connotes, e.g. hardness, density,
weight, resistance, capability of supporting animal and vegetable life.
Accordingly, the word “dry” was not changed by speech to
the last name put upon it (for its new name did not make it cease to be
called so), but while both the appellations remained, a peculiar
signification attached itself to each, the one distinguishing it in
nature and property from its opposite, the other embracing all its
attributes collectively. And so in light and day, and again in night
and darkness, we do not find a pronunciation of syllables created to
suit them by the Maker of all things, but rather through these
appellations we note the substance of the things which they signify. At
the entrance of light, by the will of God the darkness that prevailed
over the earliest creation is scattered. But the earth lying in the
midst, and being upheld on all sides by its surrounding of different
elements, as Job saith, “He hangeth the earth upon nothing Job xxvi. 7.,” it was necessary when light
travelled over one side and the earth obstructed it on the opposite by
its own bulk, that a side of darkness should be left by the
obscuration, and so, as the perpetual motion of the heavens cannot but
carry along with it the darkness resulting from the obscuration, God
ordained this revolution for a measure of duration of time. And that
measure is day and night. For this reason Moses, according to his
wisdom, in his historical elucidation of these matters, named the
shadow resulting from the earth’s obstruction, a dividing of the
light from the darkness, and the constant and measured alternation of
light and darkness over the surface of the earth he called day and
night. So that what was called light was not named day, but as
“there was light,” and not the bare name of light, so the
measure of time also was created and the name followed, not created by
God in a sound of words, but because the very nature of the thing
assumed this vocal notation. And as, if it had been plainly said by the
Lawgiver that nothing that is seen or named is of spontaneous
generation or unfashioned, but that it has its subsistence from God, we
might have concluded of ourselves that God made the world and all its
parts, and the order which is seen in them, and the faculty of
distinguishing them, so also by what he says he leads us on to
understand and believe that nothing which exists is without beginning.
And with this view he describes the successive events of Creation in
orderly method, enumerating them one after another. But it was impossible
to represent them in language, except by expressing their signification
by words that should indicate it. Since, then, it is written that God
called the light day, it must be understood that God made the day from
light, being something different, by the force of the term. For you
cannot apply the same definition to “light” and
“day,” but light is what we understand by the opposite of
darkness, and day is the extent of the measure of the interval of
light. In the same way you may regard night and darkness by the same
difference of description, defining darkness as the negation of light,
and calling night the extent of the encompassing darkness. Thus in
every way our argument is confirmed, though not, perhaps, drawn out in
strict logical form—showing that God is the Maker of things, not
of empty words. For things have their names not for His sake but for
ours. For as we cannot always have all things before our eyes, we take
knowledge of some of the things that are present with us from time to
time, and others we register in our memories. But it would be
impossible to keep memory unconfused unless we had the notation of
words to distinguish the things that are stored up in our minds from
one another. But to God all things are present, nor does He need
memory, all things being within the range of His penetrating vision.
What need, then, in His case, of parts of speech, when His own wisdom
and power embraces and holds the nature of all things distinct and
unconfused? Wherefore all things that exist substantially are from God;
but, for our guidance, all things that exist are provided with names to
indicate them. And if any one say that such names were imposed by the
arbitrary usage of mankind, he will be guilty of no offence against the
scheme of Divine Providence. For we do not say that the nature of
things was of human invention, but only their names. The Hebrew calls
Heaven by one name, the Canaanite by another, but both of them
understand it alike, being in no way led into error by the difference
of the sounds that convey the idea of the object. But the over-cautious
and timid will-worship of these clever folk, on whose authority he
asserts that, if it were granted that words were given to things by
men, men would be of higher authority than God, is proved to be
unsubstantial even by the example which we find recorded of Moses. For
who gave Moses his name? Was it not Pharaoh’s daughter who named
him from what had happened Exod. ii. 10.? For water is
called Moses in the language of the Egyptians. Since, then, in
consequence of the tyrant’s order, his parents had placed the
babe in an ark and consigned it to the stream (for so some related
concerning him), but by the will of God the ark was floated by the
current and carried to the bank, and found by the princess, who
happened just then to be taking the refreshment of the bath, as the
child had been gained “from the water,” she is said to have
given him his name as a memorial of the occurrence,—a name by
which God Himself did not disdain to address His servant, nor did He
deem it beneath Him to allow the name given by the foreign woman to
remain the Prophet’s proper appellation.