Every term—every term,
that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some
movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound thinking
is directed as far as it is possible to the knowledge and the
contemplation of some reality. But then the whole world of realities is
divided into two parts; that is, into the intelligible and the
sensible. With regard to sensible phænomena, knowledge, on account
of the perception of them being so near at hand, is open for all to
acquire; the judgment of the senses gives occasion to no doubt about
the subject before them. The differences in colour, and the differences
in all the other qualities which we judge of by means of the sense of
hearing, or smell, or touch, or taste, can be known and named by all
possessing our common humanity; and so it is with all the other things
which appear to be more obvious to our apprehension,
the things, that is, pertaining to the age in which we live, designed
for political and moral ends. But in the contemplation of the
intelligible world, on account of that world transcending the grasp of
the senses, we move, some in one way, some in another, around the
object of our search; and then, according to the idea arising in each
of us about it, we announce the result as best we can, striving to get
as near as possible to the full meaning of the thing thought about
through the medium of expressive phrases. In this, though it is often
possible to have achieved the task in both ways, when thought does not
fail to hit the mark, and utterance interprets the notion with the
appropriate word, yet it may happen that we may fail even in both, or
in one, at least, of the two, when either the comprehending faculty or
the interpreting capacity is carried beside the proper mark. There
being, then, two factors by which every term is made a correct term,
the mental exactitude and the verbal utterance, the result which
commands approval in both ways, will certainly be the preferable; but
it will not be a lesser gain, not to have missed the right conception,
even though the word itself may happen to be inadequate to that
thought. Whenever then, our thought is intent upon those high and
unseen things which sense cannot reach (I mean, upon that divine and
unspeakable world with regard to which it is an audacious thing to
grasp in thought anything in it at random and more audacious still to
trust to any chance word the representing of the conception arising
from it), then, I say, turning from the mere sound of phrases, uttered
well or ill according to the mental faculty of the speaker, we search
for the thought, and that alone, which is found within the phrases, to
see whether that itself be sound, or otherwise; and we leave the
minutiæ of phrase and name to be dealt with by the artificialities
of grammarians. Now, seeing that we mark with an appellation only those
things which we know, and those things which are above our knowledge it
is not possible to seize by any distinctive terms (for how can one put
a mark upon a thing we know nothing about?), therefore, because in such
cases there is no appropriate term to be found to mark the subject
adequately, we are compelled by many and differing names, as there may
be opportunity, to divulge our surmises as they arise within us with
regard to the Deity. But, on the other hand, all that actually comes
within our comprehension is such that it must be of one of these four
kinds: either contemplated as existing in an extension of distance, or
suggesting the idea of a capacity in space within which its details are
detected, or it comes within our field of vision by being circumscribed
by a beginning or an end where the non-existent bounds it in each
direction (for everything that has a beginning and an end of its
existence, begins from the non-existent, and ends in the non-existent),
or, lastly, we grasp the phænomenon by means of an association of
qualities wherein dying, and sufferance, and change, and alteration,
and such-like are combined. Considering this, in order that the Supreme
Being may not appear to have any connection whatever with things below,
we use, with regard to His nature, ideas and phrases expressive of
separation from all such conditions; we call, for instance, that which
is above all times pre-temporal, that which is above beginning
unbeginning, that which is not brought to an end unending, that which
has a personality removed from body incorporeal, that which is never
destroyed imperishable, that which is unreceptive of change, or
sufferance, or alteration, passionless, changeless, and unalterable.
Such a class of appellations can be reduced to any system that they
like by those who wish for one; and they can fix on these actual
appellations other appellations “privative,” for instance,
or “negative,” or whatever they like. We yield the teaching
and the learning of such things to those who are ambitious for it; and
we will investigate the thoughts alone, whether they are within or
beyond the circle of a religious and adequate conception of the
Deity.