A
DISSERTATION, &C.
INTRODUCTION
CONTAINING EXPLANATIONS OF TERMS AND GENERAL POSITION
To avoid all confusion in our inquiries concerning the end for which God created the world, a distinction should be observed between the
chief
end for which an agent performs any work, and the
ultimate
end. These two phrases are not always precisely of the same signification: and though the
chief
end be always an
ultimate
end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end. A
chief
end is opposite to an
inferior
end: an
ultimate
end is opposite to a
subordinate
end.
A
subordinate
end is what an agent aims at, not at all upon its own account, but wholly on the account of a
further
end, of which it is considered as a means. Thus when a man that goes a journey to obtain a medicine to restore his health, the obtaining of that medicine is his subordinate end; because it is not an end that he values at all upon its own account, but wholly as a means of a further end,
viz
. his health. Separate the medicine from
that further end, and it is not at all desired.
An
ultimate
end is that which the agent seeks, in what he does, for its
own
sake; what he loves, values, and takes pleasure in on its own account, and not merely as a means of a further end. As when a man loves the taste of some particular sort of fruit, and is at pains and cost to obtain it, for the sake of the pleasure of that taste which he values upon its own account, as he loves his own pleasure; and not merely for the sake of any other good, which he
supposes his enjoying that pleasure will be the means of.
Some ends are subordinate, not only as they are subordinated to an ultimate end; but also to another end that is itself but subordinate. Yea, there may be a succession or chain of many subordinate ends, one dependent on another, one sought for another; before you come to any thing that the agent aims at, and seeks for its
own
sake. As when a man sells a garment to get money—to buy tools—to till his land—to obtain a crop—to supply him with food—to gratify the
appetite. And he seeks to gratify his appetite, on its
own
account, as what is grateful in itself. Here the end of his selling his garment to get money, is only a subordinate end; and it is not only subordinate to the
ultimate
end—gratifying his appetite—but to a
nearer
end—buying husbandry tools; and his obtaining these is only a subordinate end, being only for the sake of tilling land. And the tillage of land is an end not sought on its own account, but for the sake of
the crop to be produced; and the crop produced is an end sought only for the sake of making bread; and bread is sought for the sake of gratifying the appetite.
Here gratifying the appetite is called the
ultimate
end; because it is the
last
in the chain where a man’s aim rests, obtaining in that the thing finally aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which his desire terminates and rests, it being something valued on its
own
account, then he comes to an
ultimate
end, let the chain be longer or shorter; yea, if there be but one link or one step that he takes before he comes to this end. As when
a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth, for the sake of the pleasure of the taste, without aiming at any thing further. So that an end which an agent has in view, may be both his
immediate
and his
ultimate
end; his
next
and his
last
end. That end which is sought for the sake of itself, and not for the sake of a further end, is an ultimate end; there the aim of the agent stops and rests.
A thing sought may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end; as it may be sought partly on its own account, and partly for the sake of a further end. Thus a man, in what he does, may seek the love and respect of a particular person, partly on its own account, because it is in itself agreeable to men to be the objects of others’ esteem and love; and partly, because he hopes, through the friendship of that person, to have his assistance in other
affairs; and so to be put under advantage for obtaining further ends.
A
chief
end, which is opposite to an
inferior
end, is something diverse from an ultimate end; it is most valued, and therefore most sought after by the agent in what he does. It is evident, that to be an end more valued than another end, is not exactly the same thing as to be an end valued
ultimately
, or for its own sake. This will appear, if it be considered,
1. That two different ends may be both ultimate, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their
own
sake, and both sought in the same work or acts; and yet one valued more highly, and sought more than another. Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreeable to him in
themselves
considered; and yet one may be much more agreeable than the other; and so be what he sets his heart
chiefly
upon. Thus a man may go a journey, partly to obtain the possession and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him; and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a telescope, or some new-invented and extraordinary optic glass; and the one not properly subordinate to the other; and therefore
both
may be
ultimate
ends. But yet obtaining his beloved bride may be his
chief
end; and the benefit of the optic glass his
inferior
end.
2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, because some subordinate ends may be
more
valued and sought after than some
ultimate
ends. Thus, for instance, a man may aim at two things in his journey; one, to visit his friends, and another, to receive a large sum of money. The latter may be but a subordinate end; he may not value the silver and gold on their
own
account, but only for pleasure, gratification, and honour; the money is valued only as
a means of the other. But yet, obtaining the money may be
more
valued, and so is a
higher
end of his journey than the pleasure of seeing his friends; though the latter is valued on its
own
account, and so is an
ultimate
end.
But here several things may be noted:
First
, When it is said, that some
subordinate
ends may be
more
valued than some
ultimate
ends, it is not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than
that
to which it is subordinate. For that reason it is called a
subordinate
end, because it is valued and sought not for its own sake, but only in subordination to a
further
end. But yet a subordinate end may be valued more than some
other
ultimate end that it is not subordinate to. Thus, for instance, a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, only for the value of the pleasure and honour that the money may be a means of. In this case it is impossible that the
subordinate
end,
viz.
his having the money, should be
more
valued by him than the pleasure and honour for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means, but for the
sake of the end of which it is the means. But yet he may value the money, though but a subordinate end,
more
than some
other ultimate
end to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connexion. For instance,
more
than the comfort of a friendly visit, which was one ultimate end of his journey.
Secondly
, The ultimate end is always
superior
to its subordinate end, and more valued by the agent, unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate. If he has no other means by which to obtain his last end, then the subordinate may be
as much
valued as the last end; because the last end, in such a case, altogether depends upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar
appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of hers, at a distance—and she goes a journey to her friend’s house or garden, to obtain that fruit—the
ultimate
end of her journey is to gratify that strong appetite; the obtaining that fruit, is the
subordinate
end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by
no other
means than the obtaining of that fruit; and that it will
certainly
be gratified if
she obtain it, then she will value the fruit as much as she values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwise, it will not be so. If she be
doubtful
whether that fruit will satisfy her craving, then she will not value it
equally
with the gratification of her appetite itself. Or if there be some
other fruit
that she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least
in part
, which she can obtain without such trouble as shall countervail the gratification—or if her
appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it
alone
, without something else to be compounded with it—then her
value
for her last end will be
divided
between these several ingredients as so many subordinate ends, and no
one alone
will be equally valued with the last end. Hence it rarely happens, that a subordinate end is
equally
valued with its last end; because the obtaining of a last end rarely depends on
one
single, uncompounded
means, and infallibly connected with it. Therefore, men’s
last
ends are
commonly
their
highest
ends.
Thirdly
, If any being has but
one
ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his
last
end may justly be looked upon as his
supreme
end. For in such a case,
every other
end but that one, is in order to that end; and therefore no other can be superior to it. Because, as was observed before, a subordinate end is never
more
valued than the end to which it is subordinate. Moreover, the subordinate
effects, or events, brought to pass, as means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards obtaining the one last end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now observed, the ultimate end of all must be valued more than any one of the particular means. This seems to be the case with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the sequel.
Fourthly
, Whatsoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which is agreeable to him
in itself
, and not merely for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his
last
end. The same may be said of avoiding that which is in itself painful or disagreeable; for the avoiding of what is disagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By
last
end being meant, that which is regarded
and sought by an agent, as agreeable or desirable for its
own
sake; a
subordinate
, that which is sought only for the sake of something else.
Fifthly
, From hence it will follow, that, if an agent has in view
more things than
one
that will be brought to pass by what he does, which he loves and delights in on their
own
account, then he must have
more things than one
that he regards as his
last
ends in what he does. But if there be
but one thing
that an agent seeks, on its
own
account, then there can be
but one
last end which he has in all his actions
and operations.
But only here a distinction must be observed of things which may be said to be
agreeable
to an agent, in themselves considered: (1.) What is in itself grateful to an agent, and valued on its own account,
simply
and
absolutely
considered; antecedent to, and
independent
of all conditions, or any supposition of particular cases and circumstances. And, (2.) What may be said to be in itself agreeable to an agent,
hypothetically
and
consequentially; or, on supposition of such and such circumstances, or on the happening of such a particular case.
Thus, for instance, a man may originally love society. An inclination to society may be implanted in his very nature; and society may be agreeable to him
antecedent
to all pre-supposed cases and circumstances; and this may cause him to seek a family. And the comfort of society may be originally his
last
end, in seeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order, and mutual justice and friendship in his family, may be agreeable to him, and what
he delights in for their
own
sake; and therefore these things may be his
last
end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his
original
end with respect to his family. The justice and the peace of a family was not properly his last end
before
he had a family, that induced him to seek a family, but consequentially. And the case being put of his having a family, then these things wherein the good order and beauty of a
family consist, become his last end in many things he does in such circumstances.
In like manner we must suppose that God,
before
he created the world, had some good in view, as a consequence of the world’s existence, that was
originally
agreeable to him in itself considered, that inclined him to bring the universe into existence, in such a manner as he created it. But
after
the world was created, and such and such intelligent creatures actually had existence, in such and such circumstances, then a wise, just regulation of them
was agreeable to God,
in itself
considered. And God’s love of justice, and hatred of injustice, would be sufficient in such a case to induce God to deal
justly
with his creatures, and to prevent all injustice in him towards them. But yet there is no necessity of supposing, that God’s love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what
originally
induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and so to order the occasion of doing
either justly or unjustly. The justice of God’s nature makes a just regulation agreeable, and the contrary disagreeable, as there is occasion; the
subject
being supposed, and the
occasion
given. But we must suppose something else that should incline him to
create
the subjects, or
order
the occasion.
So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulness, or his inclination to fulfil his promises to his creatures, could not properly be what
moved
him to create the world; nor could such a fulfilment of his promises to his creatures be his
last
end in giving the creatures being. But yet
after
the world is created,
after
intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himself by promise to them, then that disposition, which is called his
faithfulness, may move him in his providential disposals towards them; and this may be the
end
of many of God’s works of providence, even the exercise of his faithfulness in fulfilling his promises, and may be in the
lower
sense his
last
end; because faithfulness and truth must be supposed to be what is in
itself
amiable to God, and what he delights in for its
own
sake. Thus God may have ends of particular works of
providence
, which are ultimate ends in
a lower sense, which were not ultimate ends of the
creation
.
So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called,
original
and
independent
, the other,
consequential
and
dependent
; for it is evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends; because though their being agreeable to the agent, be consequential on the existence, yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreeable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose, that, to a righteous Being, doing
justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in
itself
, and not merely for the sake of some
other
end: And yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may be
consequential
on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.—It may be observed, that when I speak of God’s ultimate end in the creation of the world, in the following discourse, I commonly mean in that highest sense,
viz.
the
original
ultimate end.
Sixthly
, It may be further observed, that the
original
ultimate end or ends of the creation of the world is
alone
that which induces God to give the occasion for consequential ends, by the first creation of the world, and the original disposal of it. And the more original the end is, the more extensive and universal it is. That which God had
primarily
in view in creating, and the
original
ordination of the world, must be constantly kept
in view, and have a governing influence in all God’s works, or with respect to every thing he does towards his creatures. And therefore,
Seventhly
, If we use the phrase ultimate end in this highest sense, then the same that is God’s ultimate end in creating the world, if we suppose but one such end, must be what be makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in every thing he does either in creation or providence. But we must suppose, that, in the
use
to which God puts his creatures, he must evermore have a regard to the
end
for which he has made them. But if we take
ultimate end
in the other
lower
sense, God may sometimes have regard to those things as ultimate ends, in particular works of providence, which could not in any proper sense be his
last
end in creating the world.
Eighthly
, On the other hand, whatever appears to be God’s ultimate end, in any sense, of his works of providence in
general
; that must be the ultimate end of the work of
creation
itself. For though God may act for an end that is ultimate in a lower sense, in
some
of his works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world, yet this doth not take place with regard to the works of providence
in general
; for
God’s works of providence in general, are the
same
with the
general use
to which he puts the world he has made. And we may well argue from what we see of the general
use
which God makes of the world, to the general
end
for which he designed the world. Though there may be some ends of particular works of providence, that were not the
last
end of the creation, which are in themselves grateful to God in such particular emergent circumstances, and so are last ends
in an inferior sense; yet this is only in certain cases, or particular occasions. But if they are last ends of God’s proceedings in the use of the world in
general
, this shows that his making them last ends does not depend on particular cases and circumstances, but the nature of things in general, and his general design in the being and constitution of the universe.
Ninthly
, If there be but
one thing
that is originally, and independent on any future supposed cases, agreeable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be
but one last end
of God’s work, in this highest sense. But if there are
various
things, properly diverse one from another, that are absolutely, and independently agreeable to the Divine Being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there
were
several
ultimate ends of the creation in that highest sense.