(supposing that he exercises his art without being subject to any authority), I imagine that
such an answer would meet the case of any one who wished to know why he did not exercise
his art sooner,—that, being under no necessity, he made his own choice the occasion of his
operation. For men, because they do not always wish the same things910, and commonly
have not power co-operating with their will, do something which seems good to them at
that time when their choice inclines to the work, and they have no external hindrance. But
that nature which is always the same, to which no good is adventitious, in which all that
variety of plans which arises by way of opposition, from error or from ignorance, has no
place, to which there comes nothing as a result of change, which was not with it before, and
by which nothing is chosen afterwards which it had not from the beginning regarded as
good,—to say of this nature that it does not always possess what is good, but afterwards
chooses to have something which it did not choose before,—this belongs to wisdom that
surpasses us. For we were taught that the Divine. Nature is at all times full of all good, or
rather is itself the fulness of all goods, seeing that it needs no addition for its perfecting, but
is itself by its own nature the perfection of good. Now that which is perfect is equally remote
from addition and from diminution; and therefore, we say that perfection of goods which
we behold in the Divine Nature always remains the same, as, in whatsoever direction we
extend our thoughts, we there apprehend it to be such as it is. The Divine Nature, then, is
never void of good: but the Son is the fulness of all good: and accordingly He is at all times
contemplated in that Father Whose Nature is perfection in all good. But he says, “let there
be no questioning about this point, why He did not do so before:” and we shall answer
him,—“It is one thing, most sapient sir, to lay down as an ordinance some proposition that
you happen to approve911, and another to make converts by reasoning on the points of
controversy. So long, therefore, as you cannot assign any reason why we may piously say
that the Son was “afterwards” begotten by the Father, your ordinances will be of no effect
with sensible men.”
Thus it is then that Eunomius brings the truth to light for us as the result of his scientific
attack. And we for our part shall apply his argument, as we are wont to do, for the establish-
214
ment of the true doctrine, so that even by this passage it may be clear that at every point,
constrained against their will, they advocate our view. For if, as our opponent says, “He
begat the Son at that time when He chose,” and if He always chose that which is good, and
His power coincided with His choice, it follows that the Son will be considered as always
with the Father, Who always both chooses that which is excellent, and is able to possess
what He chooses. And if we are to reduce his next words also to truth, it is easy for us to
910 Reading ταὐτὰ for ταῦτα, which appears in the text of Oehler as well as in the earlier editions.
911 Reading τι τῶν κατὰ γνωμὴν, for τι τῶν καταγνωμῶν, which is the reading of the editions, but introduces
a word otherwise apparently unknown.
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He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according…