not. For up to a certain point thou hast confidence, viz. that which ariseth from the true knowledge. What then, if any one should now say that on the score of knowledge thou and the Greek will be accounted of like desert? Would it not disgust thee? I think so, indeed. For thou wouldest say that the Greek, having of his own wherewith to attain knowledge, was not willing. If then the latter also should say that God ought to have implanted knowledge in us naturally, wilt thou not laugh him to scorn, and say to him, “But why didst thou not seek for it? why wast thou not in earnest even as I?” And thou wilt stand firm with much confidence, and say that it was extreme folly to blame God for not implanting knowledge by nature. And this thou wilt say, because thou hast obtained what appertains to knowledge. So also hadst thou performed what appertains to practice, thou wouldest not have raised these questions: but thou art tired of virtuous practice, therefore thou shelterest thyself with these inconsiderate words. But how could it be at all right to cause that by necessity one should become good? Then shall we next have the brute beasts contending with us about virtue, seeing that some of them are more temperate than ourselves. But thou sayest, “I had rather have been good by necessity, and so forfeited all rewards, than evil by deliberate choice, to be punished and suffer vengeance.” But it is impossible that one should ever be good by necessity. If therefore thou knowest not what ought to be done, shew it, and then we will tell you what is right to say. But if thou knowest that unclean- ness is wicked, wherefore dost thou not fly from the evil thing? “I cannot,” thou sayest. But others who have done greater things than this will plead against thee, and will more than prevail to stop thy mouth. For thou, perhaps, though living with a wife, art not chaste; but another even without a wife keeps his chastity inviolate. Now what excuse hast thou for not keeping the rule, while another even leaps beyond the lines15 that have been drawn to mark it? But thou sayest “I am not of this sort in my bodily frame, or my turn of mind.” That is for want, not of power, but of will. For thus I prove that all have a certain aptness towards virtue: That which a man cannot do, neither will he be able to do though necessity be laid upon him; but, if, necessity being laid upon him, he is able, he that leaveth it undone, leaveth it undone out of choice. The kind of thing I mean is this: to fly up and be borne towards heaven, having a heavy body, is even simply impossible. What then, if a king should command one to do this, and threaten death, saying, “Those men who do not fly, I decree that they lose their heads, or be burnt, or some other such punishment:” would any one obey him?  Surely not. For nature is not capable of it. But if in the case of chastity this same thing were done, and he were to lay down laws that the unclean should be punished, be burnt, be scourged, should suffer the extremity of torture, would not many obey the law?  “No” thou wilt say: “for there is appointed, even now, a law forbidding to commit adultery16 and all 15 Τὰ σκὰμματα. The image is borrowed from the gymnastic exercise of leaping. 16 From the time of Constantine to that of Justinian it was a capital offence. Gibbon, e. 44. note 197. 20 Homily II