Either, he says, that which is
endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else
the two must make one. But if he call both one, he will be supporting
our argument. But if he say that the meaning of the imperishable is one
thing, and that that of being unending is another, then of necessity,
in the case of things differing from each other, the force of the one
cannot be equivalent to the force of the other. If, then, the idea of
the imperishable is one, and that of being endless is another, and each
of these is what the other is not, neither will he grant that the imperishable is
unending, nor that the unending is imperishable, but the unending will
be perishable, and the imperishable will be terminable. But I must beg
my readers not to turn a ridiculous method of condemnation against us.
We have been compelled to adopt such a sportive vein against the
mockeries of our opponent, that we might thereby break through the
puerile toil of his sophistries. But if it would not be too wearisome
to my readers, it would not be out of place again to set forth what
Eunomius says in his own words. “If,” says he, “God
is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and
ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not
imperishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is
generated.” Then returning to the charge, he repeats, “He
will then be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable: and,
as unending, at once imperishable and generated;” for I pass over
the superfluous and unseasonable remarks which he has interspersed
here, as in no way contributing to the proving of his point. Now I
think it is easy for any one to see, by his own words, that the drift
of our argument has no connection whatever with the accusation which he
lays against us. “For we call the God of the universe
imperishable and ungenerate,” says the Master, “using these
words with different applications.” “His
transcending,” he continues, “every limit of the ages, and
every distance in temporal extension, whether we consider the previous
or the subsequent, this absence of limit or circumscription on either
hand in the Eternal Life we mark in the one case with the name of
imperishability, and in the other case with the name of
ungeneracy.” But Eunomius would make out that we say that the
being without beginning is His essence, and again that the being
without end is His essence, as though we brought forward two
contradictory segments of essence; and in this way he establishes an
absurdity, and while laying down, and then fighting against, positions
of his own, and reducing notions of his own concoction to an absurdity,
he lays no hold on our argument in any single point. For that God is
imperishable only wherein His Life is unending, is his statement, not
ours. In like manner, that the imperishable is not without beginning,
is an invention of that same subtle cleverness which would constitute a
negative attribute an essence; whereas we do not define any such
negative attribute as an essence. Now it is a negative attribute of
God, that neither does the Life cease in dissolution, nor did It have a
commencement in generation; and this we express by these two words,
imperishability and ungeneracy. But Eunomius, mixing up his own folly
with our teaching, does not seem to understand that he is publishing
his own disgrace by his calumnious accusations. For, in defining
ungeneracy as an essence, he will logically arrive at the same pitch of
absurdity which he ascribes to our teaching. For as beginning means The
Latin is wrong here, “secundum rerum intellectarum distinctricem
significationem;” for νοουμένων
without the article must be the gen. absol. Besides
this the mss. read παράτασιν
(not παράστασιν). one thing, and end means another, by virtue
of an intervening extension, if any one allow the privation of the
first of these to be essence, he must suppose His Life to be only half
subsisting in this being without beginning, and not to extend further,
by virtue of His nature, to the being without end, if ungeneracy be
regarded as itself His nature. But if any one insist that both are
essence, then, according to the definition put forward by Eunomius,
each of these terms must necessarily, by virtue of its inherent
meaning, be counted as essence, being just as much as, and no more
than, is indicated by the meaning of the term; and thus the argument of
Eunomius will not be without force, inasmuch as that which is without
beginning does not involve the notion of being without end, and vice
versa, since according to his account each of the things mentioned is
an essence, and there is no confusion between the two in their relation
to each other, the notion of beginning being different to that of
ending, while the words which express privation of these also differ in
their significations.