XXIII.  And so also in those who fail to receive the Gift, some are altogether animal or bestial, according as they are either foolish or wicked; and this, I think, has to be added to their other sins, that they have no reverence at all for this Gift, but look upon it as a mere gift—to be acquiesced in if given them, and if not given them, then to be neglected.  Others know and honour the Gift, but put it off; some through laziness, some through greediness.  Others are not in a position to receive it, perhaps on account of infancy, That S. Gregory did not reject infant Baptism is clear, from the directions given later on in this Oration (c. xxviii; and cf. c. xvii. s. fin.).  He is here referring simply to the inability of infants to bring themselves to the font whereby through the mistaken scruples of parents many must have died unbaptized. or some perfectly involuntary circumstance through which they are prevented from receiving it, even if they wish.  As then in the former case we found much difference, so too in this.  They who altogether despise it are worse than they who neglect it through greed or carelessness.  These are worse than they who have lost the Gift through ignorance or tyranny, for tyranny is nothing but an involuntary error. i.e., The sins which are due altogether to external tyranny do not involve guilt, inasmuch as they are involuntary, whereas the guilt of sin is in the will.  And I think that the first will have to suffer punishment, as for all their sins, so for their contempt of baptism; and that the second will also have to suffer, but less, because it was not so much through wickedness as through folly that they wrought their failure; and that the third will be neither glorified nor punished by the righteous Judge, as unsealed and yet not wicked, but persons who have suffered rather than done wrong.  For not every one who is not bad enough to be punished is good enough to be honoured; just as not every one who is not good enough to be honoured is bad enough to be punished.  And I look upon it as well from another point of view.  If you judge the murderously disposed man by his will alone, apart from the act of murder, then you may reckon as baptized him who desired baptism apart from the reception of baptism.  But if you cannot do the one how can you do the other?  I cannot see it.  Or, if you like, we will put it thus:—If desire in your opinion has equal power with actual baptism, then judge in the same way in regard to glory, and you may be content with longing for it, as if that were itself glory.  And what harm is done you by your not attaining the actual glory, as long as you have the desire for it?