natural influence and tendency suppose causality, connexion, and necessity of event, which
are inconsistent with Arminian liberty. A tendency of Means, by biassing the heart in favour
of virtue, or by bringing the Will under the influence and power of motives in its determin-
ations, are both inconsistent with Arminian liberty of Will, consisting in indifference, and
sovereign self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.
But for the more full removal of this prejudice against the doctrine of necessity, which
has been maintained, as though it tended to encourage a total neglect of all Endeavours as
vain, the following things may be considered.
The question is not, Whether men may not thus improve this doctrine: we know that
many true and wholesome doctrines are abused: but, whether the doctrine gives any just
occasion for such an improvement; or whether, on the supposition of the truth of the doc-
trine, such a use of it would not be unreasonable? If any shall affirm, that it would not, but
that the very nature of the doctrine is such as gives just occasion for it, it must be on this
supposition; namely, that such an invariable necessity of all things already settled, must
render the interposition of all Means, Endeavours, Conclusions or Actions, of ours, in order
to the obtaining any future end whatsoever, perfectly insignificant; because they cannot in
the least alter or vary the course and series of things, in any event or circumstance; all being
already fixed unalterably by necessity: and that therefore it is folly, for men to use any Means
for any end; but their wisdom, to save themselves the trouble of Endeavours, and take their
ease. No person can draw such an inference from this doctrine, and come to such a conclu-
sion, without contradicting himself, and going counter to the very principles he pretends
to act upon: for he comes to a conclusion, and takes a course, in order to an end, even his
ease, or saving himself from trouble; he seeks something future, and uses Means in order
to a future thing, even in his drawing up that conclusion, that he will seek nothing, and use
no Means in order to any thing in future; he seeks his future ease, and the benefit and
comfort of indolence. If prior necessity, that determines all things, makes vain all actions
or conclusions of ours, in order to any thing future; then it makes vain all conclusions and
conduct of ours, in order to our future ease. The measure of our ease, with the time, manner,
and every circumstance of it, is already fixed, by all-determining necessity, as much as any
thing else. If he says within himself, “What future happiness or misery I shall have, is already,
in effect, determined by the necessary course and connexion of things; therefore, I will save
myself the trouble of labour and diligence, which cannot add to my determined degree of
happiness, or diminish my misery; but will take my ease, and will enjoy the comfort of sloth
and negligence.” Such a man contradicts himself: he says, the measure of his future happiness
and misery is already fixed, and he will not try to diminish the one, nor add to the other:
but yet, in his very conclusion, he contradicts this; for, he takes up this conclusion, to add
to his future happiness, by the ease and comfort of his negligence; and to diminish his future
trouble and misery, by saving himself the trouble of using Means and taking Pains.
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SECTION V. Objections, that this scheme of Necessity renders all Means…