Chapter 13.—Concerning the
Opinion of Plato, According to Which He Defined the Gods as Beings
Entirely Good and the Friends of Virtue.
Therefore, although in many other
important respects they differ from us, nevertheless with respect
to this particular point of difference, which I have just stated,
as it is one of
great moment, and the question
on hand concerns it, I will first ask them to what gods they think
that sacred rites are to be performed,—to the good or to the bad,
or to both the good and the bad? But we have the opinion of Plato
affirming that all the gods are good, and that there is not one of
the gods bad. It follows, therefore, that these are to be
performed to the good, for then they are performed to gods; for if
they are not good, neither are they gods. Now, if this be the
case (for what else ought we to believe concerning the gods?),
certainly it explodes the opinion that the bad gods are to be
propitiated by sacred rites in order that they may not harm us, but
the good gods are to be invoked in order that they may assist us.
For there are no bad gods, and it is to the good that, as they say,
the due honor of such rites is to be paid. Of what character,
then, are those gods who love scenic displays, even demanding that
a place be given them among divine things, and that they be
exhibited in their honor? The power of these gods proves that
they exist, but their liking such things proves that they are
bad. For it is well-known what Plato’s opinion was concerning
scenic plays. He thinks that the poets themselves, because they
have composed songs so unworthy of the majesty and goodness of the
gods, ought to be banished from the state. Of what character,
therefore, are those gods who contend with Plato himself about
those scenic plays? He does not suffer the gods to be defamed by
false crimes; the gods command those same crimes to be celebrated
in their own honor.
In fine, when they ordered these
plays to be inaugurated, they not only demanded base things, but
also did cruel things, taking from Titus Latinius his son, and
sending a disease upon him because he had refused to obey them,
which they removed when he had fulfilled their commands. Plato,
however, bad though they were, did not think they were to be
feared; but, holding to his opinion with the utmost firmness and
constancy, does not hesitate to remove from a well-ordered state
all the sacrilegious follies of the poets, with which these gods
are delighted because they themselves are impure. But Labeo
places this same Plato (as I have mentioned already in the second
book
312
) among the
demi-gods. Now Labeo thinks that the bad deities are to be
propitiated with bloody victims, and by fasts accompanied with the
same, but the good deities with plays, and all other things which
are associated with joyfulness. How comes it, then, that the
demi-god Plato so persistently dares to take away those pleasures,
because he deems them base, not from the demi-gods but from the
gods, and these the good gods? And, moreover, those very gods
themselves do certainly refute the opinion of Labeo, for they
showed themselves in the case of Latinius to be not only wanton and
sportive, but also cruel and terrible. Let the Platonists,
therefore, explain these things to us, since, following the opinion
of their master, they think that all the gods are good and
honorable, and friendly to the virtues of the wise, holding it
unlawful to think otherwise concerning any of the gods. We will
explain it, say they. Let us then attentively listen to
them.
312
Ch. 14.