Moral necessity is owing to the power and government of the inclination of the heart,
either habitual or occasional, excited by motive: but, according to natural and common
sense, the more a man does any thing with full inclination of heart, the more is it to be
charged to his account for his condemnation, if it be an ill action, and the more to be ascribed
to him for his praise, if it be good.
If the mind were determined to evil actions by contingence, from a state of indifference,
then either there would be no fault in them, or else the fault would be in being so perfectly
indifferent, that the mind was equally liable to a bad or good determination. And if this in-
difference be liberty, then the very essence of the blame or fault would lie in the liberty itself,
or the wickedness would, primarily and summarily, be in being a free agent. If there were
no fault in being indifferent, then there would be no fault in the determination being
agreeable to such a state of indifference: that is, there could be no fault found, that opposite
determinations actually happen to take place indifferently, sometimes good and sometimes
bad, as contingence governs and decides. And if it be a fault to be indifferent to good and
evil, then such indifference is no indifference to good and evil, but is a determination to
evil, or to a fault; and such an indifferent disposition would be an evil disposition, tendency,
or determination of mind.
92
So inconsistent are these notions of liberty, as essential to praise or blame. The author
of the Essays supposes men’s natural delusive sense of a liberty of contingence, to be, in
truth, the foundation of all the labour, care, and industry of mankind; 187 and that if men’s
“practical ideas had been formed on the plan of universal necessity, the ignava ratio, the
inactive doctrine of the Stoics, would have followed; and that there would have been no
room for forethought about futurity, or any sort of industry and care:” 188 plainly implying,
that, in this case, men would see and know that all their industry and care signified nothing,
was in vain, and to no purpose, or of no benefit; events being fixed in an irrefragable chain,
and not at all depending on their care and endeavour; as he explains himself, particularly,
in the instance of men’s use of means to prolong life: 189 not only very contrary to what I
largely maintain in my Inquiry, 190 but also very inconsistently with his own scheme, in
what he supposes of the ends for which God has so deeply implanted this deceitful feeling
in man’s nature; in which he manifestly supposes men’s care and industry not to be in vain
and of no benefit, but of great use, yea of absolute necessity, in order to their obtaining the
most important ends and necessary purposes of human life, and to fulfil the ends of action
to the best advantage; as he largely declares. 191 Now, how shall these things be reconciled?
187 P. 184.
188 P. 189.
189 P. 184, 185.
190 P. Especially Part IV. Sect. 5.
191 P. 188-192 and many other places.
775
SECTION XV. Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality…