the judgment to condemnation coming upon all men. But herein he is exceeding inconsistent
with himself: for he affirms in a place forecited, that the Scripture never speaks of any sen-
tence of condemnation coming upon all men, but that sentence in the third of Genesis,
concerning man turning to dust. But, according to him, the threatening of the law delivered
to Adam, could not be the ground of that sentence; for he greatly insists upon it, that that
law was entirely abrogated before that sentence was pronounced, had no existence to have
any such influence as might procure a sentence of death; and therefore this sentence was
introduced entirely on another footing, a new dispensation of grace. The reader may see
this matter strenuously urged, and particularly argued by him, p. 113—120. S. So that this
sentence could not, according to him, have the threatening of that law for its ground, as he
supposes; for it never stood upon that ground. It could not be called a judgment of condem-
nation, under any such view; for it could not be viewed in circumstances where it never ex-
isted.
5. If, as our author supposes, that the sentence of death on all men comes under the
notion of a judgment to condemnation by this means, viz. that the threatening to Adam
was in some respect the ground of it; then it also comes under the notion of a punishment:
for threatenings annexed to breaches of laws, are to punishments; and a judgment of con-
demnation to the thing threatened, must be to punishment; and the thing condemned to,
must have as much the notion of a punishment, as the sentence has the notion of a judgment
to condemnation. But this Dr. T. wholly denies: he denies that death comes as any punish-
ment at all; but insists that it comes only as a favour and benefit, and a fruit of fatherly love
to Adam’s posterity, respected not as guilty, but wholly innocent. So that his scheme will
not admit of its coming under the notion of a sentence to condemnation in any respect
whatsoever. Our author’s supposition, that the possible existence of Adam’s posterity comes
under the threatening of the law, and into the hands of the Judge, and is the ground of the
condemnation of all men to death, implies, that death by this sentence is appointed to
mankind as an evil, at least negatively so; as it is a privation of good: for he manifestly speaks
of a non-existence as a negative evil. But herein he is inconsistent with himself: for he con-
tinually insists, that mankind are subjected to death only as a benefit, as has been before
shown. According to him, death is not appointed to mankind, as a negative evil, as any
cessation of existence, or even diminution of good; but on the contrary, as a means of a
more happy existence, and a great increase of good.
So that this evasion of Dr. T. is so far from helping the matter, that it increases and
multiplies the inconsistence. And that the law, with the threatening of death annexed, was
given to Adam, as the head of mankind, and to his posterity as included in him, not only
follow from some of our author’s own assertions—and the plain, full declarations of the
apostle in the fifth of Romans, which drove Dr. T. into such gross inconsistencies—but the
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SECTION III. Adam a federal head, &c.