Though our Lord, as having two natures, had a human as well as a
divine knowledge, and though that human knowledge was not only limited
because human, but liable to ignorance in matters in which greater
knowledge was possible; yet it is the doctrine of the [later] Church,
that in fact He was not ignorant even in His human nature,
according to its capacity, since it was from the first taken out of its
original and natural condition, and ‘deified’ by its union
with the Word. As then (supr. ii. 45, note 1) His manhood was
created, yet He may not be called a creature even in His manhood, and
as (supr. ii. 14, note 5) His flesh was in its abstract nature a
servant, yet He is not a servant in fact, even as regards the flesh;
so, though He took on Him a soul which left to itself had been
partially ignorant, as other human souls, yet as ever enjoying the
beatific vision from its oneness with the Word, it never was ignorant
really, but knew all things which human soul can know. vid. Eulog.
ap. Phot. 230. p. 884. As Pope Gregory expresses it,
‘Novit in natura, non ex natura humanitatis.’ Epp.
x. 39. However, this view of the sacred subject was received by the
Church only after S. Athanasius’s day, and it cannot be denied
that others of the most eminent Fathers seem to impute ignorance to our
Lord as man, as Athan. in this passage. Of course it is not meant that
our Lord’s soul has the same perfect knowledge as He has as God.
This was the assertion of a General of the Hermits of S. Austin at the
time of the Council of Basel, when the proposition was formally
condemned, animam Christi Deum videre tam clare et intense quam clare
et intense Deus videt seipsum. vid. Berti Opp. t. 3. p. 42. Yet
Fulgentius had said, ‘I think that in no respect was full
knowledge of the Godhead wanting to that Soul, whose Person is one with
the Word: whom Wisdom so assumed that it is itself that same
Wisdom.’ ad Ferrand. iii. p. 223. ed. 1639. Yet, ad
Trasmund. i. 7. he speaks of ignorance attaching to our
Lord’s human nature.