genuity of it is trying to bias our judgment and to upset the truth. If on the other hand any
one will accept a discussion which is in a naked unsyllogistic form, we will speak upon these
points by making our study of them so far as we can follow the chain1788 of Scriptural tra-
dition. What is it, then, that we assert? We say that the fact of the reasoning animal man
being capable of understanding and knowing is most surely1789 attested by those outside
our faith; and that this definition would never have sketched our nature so, if it had viewed
anger and desire and all such-like emotions as consubstantial with that nature. In any other
case, one would not give a definition of the subject in hand by putting a generic instead of
a specific quality; and so, as the principle of desire and the principle of anger are observed
439
equally in rational and irrational natures, one could not rightly mark the specific quality by
means of this generic one. But how can that which, in defining a nature, is superfluous and
worthy of exclusion be treated as a part of that nature, and, so, available for falsifying the
definition? Every definition of an essence looks to the specific quality of the subject in hand;
and whatever is outside that speciality is set aside as having nothing to do with the required
definition. Yet, beyond question, these faculties of anger and desire are allowed to be common
to all reasoning and brute natures; anything common is not identical with that which is
peculiar; it is imperative therefore that we should not range these faculties amongst those
whereby humanity is exclusively meant: but just as one may perceive the principle1790 of
sensation, and that of nutrition and growth in man, and yet not shake thereby the given
definition of his soul (for the quality A being in the soul does not prevent the quality B being
in it too), so, when one detects in humanity these emotions of anger and desire, one cannot
on that account fairly quarrel with this definition, as if it fell short of a full indication of
man’s nature.
What then, I asked the Teacher, are we to think about this? For I cannot yet see how
we can fitly repudiate faculties which are actually within us.
You see, she replied, there is a battle of the reason with them and a struggle to rid the
soul of them; and there are men in whom this struggle has ended in success; it was so with
Moses, as we know; he was superior both to anger and to desire; the history testifying of
him in both respects, that he was meek beyond all men (and by meekness it indicates the
absence of all anger and a mind quite devoid of resentment), and that he desired none of
those things about which we see the desiring faculty in the generality so active. This could
1788 εἰρμόν.
1789 most surely, ἦ. This is the common reading: but the Codd. have mostly καὶ.
1790 Aristotle, Ethic. i. 13, dwells upon these principles. Of the last he says, i.e. the common vegetative, the
principle of nutrition and growth: “One would assume such a power of the soul in everything that grows, even
in the embryo, and just this very same power in the perfect creatures; for this is more likely than that it should
be a different one.” Sleep, in which this power almost alone is active, levels all.
817
On the Soul and the Resurrection.