11. Both readings, εἰμὲνγάρ, and εἰμὲνοὖν, will suit the sense. In the former case, it is, ‘For if I am an offender, …:’in the latter, If, now, I am an offender …,—taking up the supposition generally, after having denied the particular case of his having offended the Jews. Meyer and De Wette are at issue about the internal probability of these readings: I am disposed to agree with Meyer that a difficulty was felt in the οὖν (no expression is more frequently misunderstood and altered than μὲνοὖν ) and it was corrected into ã Ü ñ. This εἰ assumes the conviction after proof; as the following εἰ does the acquittal.
οὐ. ì å ä ý í.] Said of legal possibility: ‘non fas est aliquem.…’The dilemma here put by Paul is, “If I am guilty, it is not by them, but by Cœsar, that I must be (and am willing to be) tried, sentenced, and punished. If I am innocent, and Cœsar acquits me, then clearly none will be empowered to give me up to them: therefore, at all events, guilty or innocent, I am not to be made their victim.”
Ê á ß ò. ἐπικαλ.] I call upon, i.e. appeal to (provoco ad) Cæsar. This power (of ‘provocatio ad populum’) having existed in very early times (e.g. the case of Horatius, Livy i. 26), was ensured to Roman citizens by the Lex Valeria (see Livy ii. 8, U.C. 245), suspended by the Decemviri, but solemnly re-established after their deposition (Liv. iii. 55, U.C. 305), when it was decreed that it should be unlawful to make any magistrate from whom there did not lie an appeal. When the emperors absorbed the power of the populus and the tribunitial veto in themselves, the ‘provocatio ad populum’and ‘appellatio ad tribunos’were both made to the princeps. See Smith’s Dict. of Antt. art. Appellatio. In Pliny’s celebrated Epistle respecting the Bithynian Christians (x. 97), we read, “Fuerunt alii similis amentiæ: quos, quia cives Romani erant, adnotavi in urbem remittendos.”