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1. Now Faith is (the rec. text has a comma after ð ß ó ô é ò, thus throwing the stress upon ἔστιν, and making it mean either, “Now there is a faith, which is” &c., or “Now faith really exists, being” &c. And the alleged ground for this arrangement is, that the ordinary rendering, “Now faith is,”would require πίστιςδέἐστιν, or ἡδὲπίστιςἐστίν. But this argument is nugatory. ἔστιν at the opening of the sentence does, it is true, often indicate emphatically absolute existence, e. g. ch. Hebrews 4:13; Acts 13:15; 1 Corinthians 8:5; 1 Corinthians 15:44 al. fr. (in Del.); but frequently it is the mere logical copula, with a certain emphasis on it, carrying a strong affirmation or negation of the truth of the subsequent predication. See Delitzsch here, and Winer, § 7. 3. So that our Writer does not say, ‘There is a faith, which is.…,’nor ‘Faith has a real existence, being.…,’but he describes that ð ß ó ô é ò to which in ch. Hebrews 10:39 he had stated us to belong. And this word ‘describes’is perhaps more strictly correct than ‘defines:’for the words which follow are not a definition of that in which faith consists, but of that which faith serves as and secures to us. A definition would approach rather from the side of the subjective phænomena of faith. Yet when speaking broadly and not strictly, we may well call this the definition of faith: and nearly so Thomas Aquinas (in Del.), “Respondeo dicendum, quod licet quidam dicant prædicta Apostoli verba non esse fidei definitionem, quia definitio indicat rei quidditatem et essentiam, tamen, si quis recte consideret, omnia, ex quibus potest fides definiri, in prædicta descriptione tanguntur, licet verba non ordinentur sub forma definitionis.”Delitzsch compares several forms of similar definitions in Philo, e. g. ἔστιδὲστεναγμὸςσφόδρακαὶἐντεταμένηλύπη (Leg. Alleg. iii. 75, vol. i. p. 129): ἔστιδὲεὐχὴαἴτησιςἀγαθῶνπαρὰθεοῦ (Quod Deus Immut. 19, p. 285): ἔστιγὰρφιλοσοφίαἐπιτήδευσιςσοφίας, σοφίαδὲἐπιστήμηθείωνκ. ἀνθρωπίνωνκαὶτῶντούτωναἰτιῶν (De Congr. Quær. Erud. Gr. 14, p. 530): and an appositional one of faith itself, De Conf. Ling. 9, p. 409, where it is said to be ἡὀχυρωτάτηκαὶβεβαιοτάτηδιάθεσις, and, De Migr. Abr. 9, p. 442, he says of faith, ἀρτηθεῖσαγὰρκαὶἐκκρεμασθεῖσαἐλπίδοςχρηστῆς, καὶἀνενδοίαστανομίσασαἤδηπαρεῖναιτὰμὴπαρόντα, διὰτὴντοῦὑποσχομένουβεβαιοτάτηνπίστιν, ἀγαθὸντέλειον, ἆθλονεὕρηται. It was this passage apparently which led Jerome to make the remark which Grotius quotes in his note on James 2:23, “Quæsi quis recte consideret, inveniet optime concurrere cum eo quod Scriptor ad Hebræos, Philoneum aliquid spirans ut Hieronymo videtur, scripsit, ἔστιδὲπίστιςκ. ô. ë.”Notice that it is of faith in general, all faith, not here of faith in God in particular, that the Writer is speaking: and ð ß ó ô é ò is anarthrous, as throughout the chapter) confidence (there has been much difference concerning the meaning of ὑπόστασις. The ancients for the most part understand it here as “substantia” (so vulg.), substance, the real and true essence: faith gives reality to things not yet seen, so that they are treated as veritably present. So e. g. Chrys., ἐπειδὴγὰρτὰἐνἐλπίδιἀνυπόσταταεἶναιδοκεῖ, ἡπίστιςὑπόστασιναὐτοῖςχαρίζεταιμᾶλλονδὲοὐχαρίζεταιἀλλ ʼ αὐτόἐστινοὐσίααὐτῶνοἷονἡἀνάστασιςοὐπαραγέγονενοὐδέἐστινἐνὑποστάσει, ἀλλ ʼ ἡἐλπὶςὑφίστησιναὐτὴνἐντῇἡμετέρᾳψυχῇ: Thdrt., δείκνυσινὡςὑφεστῶτατὰμηδέπωγεγενημένα: Œc., πίστιςἐστὶναὐτὴἡὑπόστασιςκαὶοὐσίατῶνἐλπιζομένωνπραγυάτωνἐπειδὴγὰρτὰἐνἐλπίσινἀνυπόστατάἐστινὡςτέωςμὴπαρόντα, ἡπίστιςοὐσίατιςαὐτῶνκαὶὑπόστασιςγίνεται, εἶναιαὐτὰκαὶπαρεῖναιτρόποντινὰπαρασκευάζουσαδιὰτοῦπιστεύεινεἶναι: Thl., οὐσίωσιςτῶνμήπωὄντωνκαὶὑπόστασιςτῶνμὴὑφεστώτων: Ambr[58] (De Pœnit. ii. 3 (15), vol. ii. p. 419), Aug[59] (In Joann. Tract. lxxix. 1, vol. iii. pt. ii.), Vatablus (“rerum quæsperantur essentia”), H. Steph. (“illud quod facit ut jam exstent, quæsperantur”), Schlichting, Bengel, Heinrichs, Bisping, al. Others have rendered it “fundamentum:”so Faber Stap., Erasm. (paraphr.), Calvin, Beza (“illud quo subsistunt”), Clarius, Stein, Sykes, Carpzov, al. On the other hand the majority of modern Commentators have preferred the meaning which ὑπόστασις bears in ch. Hebrews 3:14, where see note: viz. “confidence.”So Luther, Camero, Grotius, Hammond, Wolf, Böhme, Bleek, De Wette, Tholuck, Stuart, Ebrard, Lünemann, Delitzsch, al. And there can be no reasonable doubt, that this is the true rendering here. Thus only do the two descriptions given correspond in nature and quality: and thus only does ὑπόστασις itself answer to what we might expect by ἐλπιζομένων being used and not some word like ἀνυποστάτων. The one being subjective in both these cases of parallel, it is but reasonable that the other should be also. Delitzsch, as usual when any psychological question arises, has gone into this matter at great length, and his note should by all means be read. He compares a very remarkable passage of Dante, Paradiso, xxiv. 52–81) of things hoped for (the old Latin versions were certainly wrong in rendering ἐλπιζομένων “sperantium.”But, granting that it is neuter, a question arises as to the arrangement of the word ð ñ á ã ì Ü ô ù í, whether it belongs to ἐλπιζομένων or to οὐβλεπομένων. Chrys., Œc., the vulg., Calvin in his version, Estius, Böhme, al. join it with the former: Thl., Ambrose, Aug[60], Faber Stap., most of the Commentators, and, as Bleek believes, all the editions, with the latter. And for two reasons, this seems to be the right connexion. It preserves the rhythm better, which otherwise would halt, by the second clause being so much shorter than the first,—and it is more likely that ð ñ á ã ì Ü ô ù í, indicating as it does rather material objective facts than objects of hope, should be joined with the objective οὐβλεπομένων, than with the subjective ἐλπιζομένων ), demonstration (another dispute has arisen, about the meaning of ἔλεγχος. From ἐλέγχειν, to convict, or convince, of persons,—to prove or demonstrate, of things, comes ἔλεγχος, conviction, or proof: Aristot. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 14, ἔλεγχοςδέἐστινὁμὲνμὴδυνατὸςἄλλωςἔχεινἀλλ ʼ οὕτωςὡςἡμεῖςλέγομεν. So the vulg. has rendered “argumentum,”—Aug[61], Prosper., Mutianus, “convictio,”—Calvin, “demonstratio”or “evidentia” (“evidence,”E. V.), Hammond (and similarly Luther), “firma persuasio.”Chrys. says, βαβαίοἵᾳἐχρήσατολέξειεἰπὼνἔλεγχοςοὐβλεπομένωνἔλεγχοςγὰρλέγεταιἐπὶτῶνλίανἀδήλων (but the reading of the best mss. and of the Benedictine edn. is ä Þ ë ù í )· ἡπίστιςτοίνυνἐστὶνὄψιςτῶνἀδήλων, ö ç ó ß, καὶεἰςτὴναὐτὴντοῖςὁρωμένοιςφέρειπληροφορίαντὰμὴὁρώμενα: Œc., ἀπόδειξιςτῶνοὐβλεπομένωνἀποδείκνυσιδὲὁρατὰτὰἀόραταἡπίστιςπῶς; τῷνῷκαὶταῖςἐλπίσινὁρῶσατὰμὴφαινόμενα: Thl., ἔλεγχος, τουτέστιδεῖξιςκαὶφανέρωσιςἀδήλωνπραγμάτωνποιεῖγὰρταῦταβλέπεσθαιτῷνῷἡμῶνὡςπορόντα. The old Latin version in D renders most strangely, “accusator non videntium.”The modern Commentators are divided: some have taken the subjective sense of conviction,—inward persuasion of the truth of: so Menken, Bleek, De W., Lünem. But, as Tholuck remarks, this sense of the word is hardly borne out by usage. And therefore we seem driven back on the objective meaning as referred to things, viz. proof, or demonstration. This is adopted by Bengel, Böhme, Stier, Ebrard, Hofmann, al. As far as the sense is concerned, both come to the same in the end. It is faith, an act of the mind, which is this demonstration: it is therefore necessarily subjective in its effect,—is the demonstration to him who believes) of matters (see above) not seen (this πράγματαοὐβλεπόμενα is a much wider designation than ἐλπιζόμενα, embracing the whole realm of the spiritual and invisible, even to the being and essence of God Himself: see below, Hebrews 11:6; and cf. Romans 8:24, where St. Paul’s expressions differ slightly in form from these. There is no ground whatever for saying that our Writer makes faith identical with hope. Faith is the ὑπόστασις of ἐλπιζόμενα: Hope exists independently of it, but derives its reality, and is ripened into confidence, by its means. And faith is the demonstration to us of that which we do not see: cf. the beautiful words of Calvin: “Nobis vita æterna promittitur, sed mortuis: nobis sermo fit de beata resurrectione, interea putredine sumus obvoluti: justi pronuntiamur, et habitat in nobis peccatum: audimus nos esse beatos, interea obruimur infinitis miseriis: promittitur bonorum omnium affluentia, prolixe vero esurimus et sitimus: clamat Deus statim se nobis adfuturum, sed videtur surdus esse ad clamores nostros. Quid fierit, nisi spei inniteremur, ac mens nostra prælucente Dei verbo ac spiritu per medias tenebras supra mundum emergeret?”). [58] Ambrose, Bp. of Milan, A.D. 374–397 [59] Augustine, Bp. of Hippo, 395–430 [60] Augustine, Bp. of Hippo, 395–430 [61] Augustine, Bp. of Hippo, 395–430

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