attributed to the will of God, we neither deny nor do we designate it by the name of fate,
unless, perhaps, we may understand fate to mean that which is spoken, deriving it from fari,
to speak; for we cannot deny that it is written in the sacred Scriptures, “God hath spoken
once; these two things have I heard, that power belongeth unto God. Also unto Thee, O
God, belongeth mercy: for Thou wilt render unto every man according to his works.”197
Now the expression, “Once hath He spoken,” is to be understood as meaning “immovably,”
that is, unchangeably hath He spoken, inasmuch as He knows unchangeably all things which
shall be, and all things which He will do. We might, then, use the word fate in the sense it
bears when derived from fari, to speak, had it not already come to be understood in another
sense, into which I am unwilling that the hearts of men should unconsciously slide. But it
does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore
be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are in-
cluded in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge,
for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew all the causes of
things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills. For even
that very concession which Cicero himself makes is enough to refute him in this argument.
For what does it help him to say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every
cause is not fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause? It
is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a cause. For we
say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not a mere name for the absence of
causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to
that of spirits of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by no means separate
them from the will of Him who is the author and framer of all nature. But now as to volun-
tary causes. They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of
whatever description, if indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid of reason,
by which, in accordance with their own nature, they seek or shun various things, are to be
called wills. And when I speak of the wills of angels, I mean either the wills of good angels,
whom we call the angels of God, or of the wicked angels, whom we call the angels of the
devil, or demons. Also by the wills of men I mean the wills either of the good or of the
wicked. And from this we conclude that there are no efficient causes of all things which
come to pass unless voluntary causes, that is, such as belong to that nature which is the
spirit of life. For the air or wind is called spirit, but, inasmuch as it is a body, it is not the
spirit of life. The spirit of life, therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator of
every body, and of every created spirit, is God Himself, the uncreated spirit. In His supreme
197 Ps. lxii. 11, 12.
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Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Opposition…