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ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY the pertinacity, vigour, and consistencywithwhich he keeps before his own mind and that of his reader certain propositions of high generality and far-reaching significance, so as to exhibit them from various points of view, and with most abundant, vivid, and apt illustration. No one ever possessed in a higher degree the power of saying virtually the same thing again and again without rendering it stale ; and this was because, to his own mind, it was constantly appearing in new lights, which gave it unfailing freshness of interest. This holds more especially as regards the systematic exposition of his philosophy in the Institutes of Metaphysic. What Ferrier regarded as the lead- ing merit of this work was its rigidly deductive method. He intended it to contain and believed it to contain only propositions either self-evident or strictly inferred from other propositions which are self-evident. A careful examination of the book shows that this claim is illusory. If taken seriously it exposes Ferrier to damaging criticism, and tends to obscure the real value of his work. Many of the pretended inferences obviously do not mark any really fresh step at all ; they are merely restate- ments of what has been said before, considered from a somewhat different point of view. At certain points, there appears to be a genuine advance and not a mere marking oftime ; but it is just at these points that well-founded doubt arises as to the strictness of the reasoning. The reader, when he seriously raises the question whether the new proposition inevitably follows from the assigned premisses, will, at first, find himself compelled to deny that this is so ; and he will be right in this denial if the premisses be taken in the sense in which he has been all along understanding them. But on further reflection he will discern that a proposition of vital importance to the argument is ambiguous, so that if it be taken in one sense his difficulty remains, and if it is taken in another his difficulty disappears ; he will then, for the most part, find that it is the second 158

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