We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good man knew with absolute certainty
it would be best, all things considered, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the
world, it would not be contrary to his wisdom and goodness, for him to choose that it should
be so. It is no evil desire, to desire good, and to desire that which, all things considered, is
best. And it is no unwise choice, to choose that that should be, which it is best should be;
and to choose the existence of that thing concerning which this is known, viz. that it is best
it should be, and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be chosen. On the contrary,
it would be a plain defect in wisdom and goodness, for him not to choose it. And the reason
why he might not order it, if he were able, would not be because he might not desire it, but
only the ordering of that matter does not belong to him. But it is no harm for him who is,
by right, and in the greatest propriety, the Supreme Orderer of all things, to order every
thing in such a manner, as it would be a point of wisdom in him to choose that they should
be ordered. If it would be a plain defect of wisdom and goodness in a being, not to choose
that that should be, which he certainly knows it would, all things considered, be best should
be, (as was but now observed,) then it must be impossible for a Being who has no defect of
wisdom and goodness, to do otherwise than choose it should be; and that, for this very
reason, because he is perfectly wise and good. And if it be agreeable to perfect wisdom and
goodness for him to choose that it should be, and the ordering of all things supremely and
perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite wisdom and goodness, to order
that it should be. If the choice is good, the ordering and disposing things according to that
choice must also be good. It can be no harm in one to whom it belongs “to do his Will in
the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth,” to execute a good volition.
If this Will be good, and the object of his Will be, all things considered, good and best, then
the choosing or willing it is not willing evil that good may come. And if so, then his ordering,
according to that Will, is not doing evil that good may come.
2. It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme Being thus to order and permit that
moral evil to be, which it is best should come to pass. For that it is of good tendency, is the
very thing supposed in the point now in question.—Christ’s crucifixion, though a most
horrid fact in them that perpetrated it, was of a most glorious tendency as permitted and
ordered of God.
3. Nor is there any need of supposing, it proceeds from any evil disposition or aim; for
by the supposition, what is aimed at is good, and good is the actual issue, in the final result
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of things 154
154 From the whole strain of our author’s defence of his principles, in reference to the existence of sin in the
universe, though there are many excellent remarks interspersed, and sound reasoning as far as his data would
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SECTION IX. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been…