Well, then, if God did not exist
formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be
called either unending or without beginning; and so also neither
inalterable, nor incorporeal, nor imperishable, if there is any
suspicion of body, or destruction, or alteration with regard to Him.
But if it be part of our religion to attribute to Him none of these
things, then it is a sacred duty to use of Him names privative of the
things abhorrent to His Nature, and to say all that we have so often
enumerated already, viz. that He is imperishable, and unending, and
ungenerate, and the other terms of that class, where the sense inherent
in each only informs us of the privation of that which is obvious to
our perception, but does not interpret the actual nature of that which
is thus removed from those abhorrent conditions. What the Deity is not,
the signification of these names does point out; but what that further
thing, which is not these things, is essentially, remains undivulged.
Moreover, even the rest of these names, the sense of which does
indicate some position or some state, do not afford that indication of
the Divine nature itself, but only of the results of our reverent
speculations about it. For when we have concluded generally that no single
thing existing, whether an object of sense or of thought, is formed
spontaneously or fortuitously, but that everything discoverable in the
world is linked to the Being Who transcends all existences, and
possesses there the source of its continuance, and we then perceive the
beauty and the majesty of the wonderful sights in creation, we thus get
from these and such-like marks a new range of thoughts about the Deity,
and interpret each one of the thoughts thus arising within us by a
special name, following the advice of Wisdom, who says that “by
the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionately the Maker of
them is seen Wisdom xiii.
5..” We address therefore as
Creator Him Who has made all mortal things, and as Almighty Him Who has
compassed so vast a creation, Whose might has been able to realize His
wish. When too we perceive the good that is in our own life, we give in
accordance with this the name of Good to Him Who is our life’s
first cause. Then also having learnt from the Divine writings the
incorruptibility of the judgment to come, we therefore call Him Judge
and Just, and to sum up in one word, we transfer the thoughts that
arise within us about the Divine Being into the mould of a
corresponding name; so that there is no appellation given to the Divine
Being apart from some distinct intuition about Him. Even the word God
(Θεὸς) we understand
to have come into usage from the activity of His seeing; for our faith
tells us that the Deity is everywhere, and sees (θεασθαι) all things, and penetrates all things, and then we stamp
this thought with this name (Θεὸς), guided to it
by the Holy Voice. For he who says, “O God, attend unto me Ps. lv. 2.,” and, “Look, O God Ps. cxix. 132.,” and, “God knoweth the secrets
of the heart plainly Ps. xliv. 21.,” reveals the
latent meaning of this word, viz. that Θεὸς is so called
from θεασθαι. For there is no difference between saying “Attend
unto,” “Look,” and “See.” Since, then,
the seer must look towards some sight, God is rightly called the Seer
of that which is to be seen. We are taught, then, by this word one
sectional operation of the Divine Being, though we do not grasp in
thought by means of it His substance itself, believing nevertheless
that the Divine glory suffers no loss because of our being at a loss
for a naturally appropriate name. For this inability to give expression
to such unutterable things, while it reflects upon the poverty of our
own nature, affords an evidence of God’s glory, teaching us as it
does, in the words of the Apostle, that the only name naturally
appropriate to God is to believe Him to be “above every name Philip. ii. 9..” That he transcends every effort of
thought, and is far beyond any circumscribing by a name, constitutes a
proof to man of His ineffable majesty The
theology of Gregory and his master Origen rises above the unconscious
Stoicism of Tertullian, and even that of Clement, which has an air of
materialistic pantheism about it, owing to his attempt, like that of
Eunomius, to base our knowledge of God upon abstractions and analogies
drawn from nature. The result, indeed, of the “abstraction
process” of Clement is only a multiplication of negative terms,
“immensity,” “simplicity,”
“eternity,” &c. But they will lead to nothing, if there
is not already behind them all some positive idea which we have
received from a different source. Faith is this source; it is
described by Origen as “an ineffable grace of the soul which
comes from God in a kind of enthusiasm;” which formula expresses
the primary fact of religious consciousness such as Leibnitz
demonstrated it: and the positive idea supplied by this faculty is with
Origen Goodness (rather than the Good). He would put Will as
well as Mind into the Central Idea of Metaphysics, and would have the
heart governed as well as the reason. All that he says about the
“incomprehensibility” of God does not militate against
this: for we must have some idea of that which is incomprehensible to
us: and the Goodness of the Deity is the side on which we gain this
idea..