14. but (continuation of and contrast to Hebrews 5:13) solid food belongs to (is the portion of) the grown up (so ô Ý ë å é ï ò often: e. g. Xen. Cyr. viii. 7. 3, ἐγὼγὰρπαῖςτεὢντὰἐνπαισὶνομιζόμενακαλὰδοκῶκεκαρπῶσθαιἐπεὶδὲἤβησα, τὰἐννεανίσκοιςτέλειόςτεἀνὴργενόμενος, τὰἐνἀνδράσι: Polyb. v. 29. 2, ἐλπίσαντεςὡςπαιδίῳνηπίῳχρήσασθαιτῷΦιλίππῳ, εὗροναὐτὸντέλειονἄνδρα. The spiritual sense is found in reff.: Thl. says, ὁρᾷςνηπιότηταἑτέραν, ἣνκαὶγέροντεςἔχουσι, τὴντῶνφρενῶν, καὶτελειότητα, ἣνκαὶνέουςἔχεινοὐδὲνἐμποδίζει. Then the qualification of ô å ë å ß ù í follows), to those who by virtue of their (long) habit ( ἕξις from ἔχω, as ‘habitus’from ‘habeo.’Quintil. lnst. x. 1 init., “Sed hæc eloquendi præcepta, sicut cognitioni sunt necessaria, ita non satis ad vim dicendi valent, nisi illis firma quædam facilitas, quae apud Græcos ἕξις vocatur, acceperit: quam scribendo plus, an legendo, an dicendo, consequamur, solere quæri scio.”Aristot. Rhet. i. 1, οἱμὲνεἰκῆταῦταδρῶσιν, οἱδὲδιὰσυνήθειανἀπὸἕξεως.
Observe, on account of this meaning of the word as well as the accus. after διὰ, it is not, “by means of skill acquired in practice,”as Œc. ( τὴνἕξινλέγειτὴντελειότητα, so also Thl., adding, καὶτὴνπαγιότητατῶνἐθῶν ), Bengel (“ ἕξις notat h. 1. robur facultatis cognoscentis ex maturitate ætatis spiritualis existens”): but, ‘on account of (their) long usage,’so that ἕξις stands in a causal, not in an instrumental relation to the result. Notice also that διὰτὴνἕξιν is not = ä é ʼ ἕξιν, ‘by virtue of habit’ (abstract),—and that, on account of its position, it belongs not to ã å ã õ ì í á ó ì Ý í á, but to the whole sentence) have their organs of sense (not, their senses themselves. Wetst. quotes a definition ascribed to Galen, τὸαἰσθητήριον, τὸαἴσθησίντιναἐμπεπιστευμένονὄργανον.… ἤτοιὀφθαλμός, ἢῥίς, ἢγλῶττα, ἃκαὶὄργανααἰσθητικὰπροσαγορεύεται. Here again there manifestly is a mixture of the figure and the thing signified: on account of what follows, we must necessarily understand these αἰσθητήρια of the inner organs of the soul: as Œc., τὰτῆςψυχῆςαἰσθητήριαλέγει ) exercised (reff.) with a view to (so in ref. 1 Tim., γύμαναζεδὲσεαυτὸνπρὸςεὐσέβειαν: see also reff. here. ð ñ ü ò most likely belongs to ã å ã õ ì í á ó ì Ý í á, not to the whole τῶν.… ἐχόντων, because of the art. ô Ü, which makes ã å ã õ ì í á ó ì Ý í á a predicate, not an epithet. See the very similar passage of Galen in reff.) distinction of good and evil (this puts us in mind, as Bleek remarks, of the common O. T. expression in describing childhood: e. g.
Deuteronomy 1:39, πᾶνπαιδίοννέον, ὅστιςοὐκοἶδενσήμερονἀγαθὸνἢκακόν: Isaiah 7:16, πρὶνγνῶναιτὸπαιδίονἀγαθὸνἢκακόν. Cf. Sext. Empir. Hyp. Pyrrh. iii. 19, λείπεταιδὲτὸἠθικόν, ὅπερδοκεῖπερὶτὴνδιάκρισιντῶντεκαλῶνκαὶκακῶνκαὶἀδιαφόρωνκαταγίγνεσθαι.
The reference here of good and evil is manifestly not to moral qualities, but to excellence and inferiority, wholesomeness and corruptness in doctrine. Chrys. explains it well: νῦνοὐπερὶβίουὁλόγος, ὅτανλέγῃπρὸςδιάκρ. καλοῦκ. κακοῦτοῦτογὰρπαντὶἀνθρώπῳδυνατὸνεἰδέναικ. εὔκολονἀλλὰπερὶδογμάτωνὑγιῶνκ. ὑψηλῶνδιεφθαρμένωντεκαὶταπεινῶν. τὸπαιδίονοὐκοἶδετὴνφαύληνκ. τὴνδόκιμοντροφὴνδιαιρεῖνπολλάκιςγοῦνκαὶχοῦνἐνέβαλενεἰςτὸστόμα, καὶτὸβλαβερὸνἐδέξατο, καὶπάνταἀδιακρίτωςποιεῖἀλλ ʼ οὐτὸτέλειοντοιοῦτον. τοιοῦτοίεἰσινοἱπᾶσινἁπλῶςπροσέχοντες, ê. ἀδιακρίτωςτὰςἀκοὰςἐκδιδόντεςἀδοκίμοις. καὶτούτουςαἰτιᾶταιὡςἁπλῶςπεριφερομένους, ê. νῦνμὲντούτοιςνῦνδὲἐκείνοιςδιδόνταςἑαυτούςὃκαὶπρὸςτῷτελειᾐνίξατολέγωνδιδαχαῖςποικίλαιςκ. ξέναιςμὴπαραφέρεσθε. τοῦτόἐστιπρὸςδιάκρισινκαλοῦτεκαὶκακοῦλάρυγξμὲνγὰρσῖταγεύεται, ψυχὴδὲδοκιμάζειλογους. But we must beware of the mistake to which Chrys. gives some countenance, and which Œe. and Thl. repeat, that the ê á ë ü í represents δόγματαὑψηλά, and ê á ê ü í, and, ä ü ã ì á ô á ô á ð å é í Ü ).