I suppose that it is so far from being true, that our minds are naturally possessed with
a notion of such liberty as this, so strongly, that it is impossible to root it out, that indeed
men have no such notion of liberty at all, and that it is utterly impossible, by any means
whatsoever, to implant or introduce such a notion into the mind As no such notions as
imply self-contradiction and self-abolition can subsist in the mind, as I have shown in my
Inquiry; I think a mature sensible consideration of the matter is sufficient to satisfy any one,
that even the greatest and most learned advocates themselves for liberty of indifference and
self-determination, have no such notion; and that indeed they mean something wholly in-
consistent with, and directly subversive of, what they strenuously affirm, and earnestly
contend for. By a man having a power of determining his own Will, they plainly mean a
power of determining his Will as he pleases, or as he chooses; which supposes that the mind
has a choice, prior to its going about to confirm any action or determination to it. And if
they mean that they determine even the original or prime choice, by their own pleasure or
choice, as the thing that causes and directs it; I scruple not most boldly to affirm, that they
speak they know not what, and that of which they have no manner of idea; because no such
contradictory notion can come into, or have a moment’s subsistence in, the mind of any
man living, as an original or first choice being caused, or brought into being, by choice.
After all, they say, they have no higher or other conception of liberty, than that vulgar notion
of it, which I contend for, viz. a man’s having power or opportunity to do as he chooses: or
if they had a notion that every act of choice was determined by choice, yet it would destroy
their notion of the contingence of choice; for then no one act of choice would arise contin-
gently, or from a state of indifference, but every individual act, in all the series, would arise
from foregoing bias or preference, and from a cause predetermining and fixing its existence,
which introduces at once such a chain of causes and effects, each preceding link decisively
fixing the following, as they would by all means avoid.
And such kind of delusion and self-contradiction as this, does not arise in men’s minds
by nature: it is not owing to any natural feeling which God has strongly fixed in the mind
and nature of man; but to false philosophy, and strong prejudice, from a deceitful abuse of
words. It is artificial; not in the sense of the author of the Essays, supposing it to be a deceitful
artifice of God; but artificial as opposed to natural, and as owing to an artificial deceitful
management of terms, to darken and confound the mind. Men have no such thing when
they first begin to exercise reason; but must have a great deal of time to blind themselves
with metaphysical confusion, before they can embrace, and rest in, such definitions of liberty
as are given, and imagine they understand them.
On the whole, I humbly conceive, that whosoever will give himself the trouble of
weighing, what I have offered to consideration in my Inquiry, must be sensible, that such a
moral necessity of men’s actions as I maintain, is not at all inconsistent with any liberty that
any creature has, or can have, as a free, accountable, moral agent, and subject of moral
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SECTION XV. Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality…