S. Gregory’s own doctrine,
indeed, has seemed to some critics to be open to the charge of
tritheism. But even if his doctrine were entirely expressed in the
single illustration of which we have spoken, it does not seem that the
charge would hold good, when we consider the light in which the
illustration would present itself to him. The conception of the unity
of human nature is with him a thing intensely vivid: it underlies much
of his system, and he brings it prominently forward more than once in
his more philosophical writings Especially in the treatise, De Animâ et Resurrectione,
and in that De Conditione Hominis. A notable instance is to be
found in the former (p. 242 A.).. We cannot, in
fairness, leave his realism out of account when we are estimating the
force of his illustration: and therefore, while admitting that the
illustration was one not unlikely to produce misconceptions of his
teaching, we may fairly acquit him of any personal bias towards
tritheism such as might appear to be involved in the unqualified
adoption of the same illustration by a writer of our own time, or such
as might have been attributed to theologians of the period of S.
Gregory who adopted the illustration without the qualification of a
realism as determined as his own See
Dorner, ut sup., p. 315, and p. 319, note 2.. But the illustration
does not stand alone: we must not consider that it is the only one of
those to be found in the treatise, De Diff. Essen. et Hypost.,
which he would have felt justified in employing. Even if the
illustration of the rainbow, set forth in that treatise, was not
actually his own (as Dorner, ascribing the treatise to him, considers
it to have been), it was at all events (on the other theory of the
authorship), included in the teaching he had received from his
“master:” it would be present to his mind, although in his
undisputed writings, where he is dealing with objections brought
against the particular illustration from human relations, he naturally
confines himself to the particular illustration from which an erroneous
inference was being drawn. In our estimate of his teaching the one
illustration must be allowed to some extent to qualify the effect
produced by the other. And, further, we must remember that his argument
from human relations is professedly only an illustration. It
points to an analogy, to a resemblance, not to an identity of
relations; so much he is careful in his reply to state. Even if it were
true, he implies, that we are warranted in speaking, in the given case,
of the three human persons as “three men,” it would not
follow that we should be warranted thereby in speaking of the three
Divine Persons as “three Gods.” For the human personalities
stand contrasted with the Divine, at once as regards their being and as
regards their operation. The various human πρόσωπα draw their being from many other πρόσωπα, one from one, another from another, not, as the Divine,
from One, unchangeably the same: they operate, each in his own way,
severally and independently, not, as the Divine, inseparably: they are
contemplated each by himself, in his own limited sphere, κατ᾽
ἰδίαν
περιγραφήν, not, as the Divine, in mutual essential connexion,
differentiated one from the other only by a certain mutual relation.
And from this it follows that the human πρόσωπα are capable of enumeration in a sense in which number cannot be
considered applicable to the Divine Persons. Here we find S.
Gregory’s teaching brought once more into harmony with his
“master’s:” if he has been willing to carry the use
of numerical terms rather further than S. Basil was prepared to do, he
yet is content in the last resort to say that number is not in
strictness applicable to the Divine ὑποστάσεις, in that they cannot be contemplated κατ᾽
ἰδίαν
περιγραφήν, and therefore cannot be enumerated by way of addition.
Still the distraction of the ὑποστάσεις
remains; and if there is no other way (as he seems to
have considered there was none), of making full
acknowledgment of their distinct though inseparable existence than to
speak of them as “three,” he holds that that use of
numerical language is justifiable, so long as we do not transfer the
idea of number from the ὑποστάσεις
to the οὐσία, to that
Nature of God which is Itself beyond our conception, and which we can
only express by terms suggested to us by what we know of Its
operation.